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HYPOTHESIS
Legislation proposed by members of the 103rd Congress to
address towing vessel safety resulted from three focusing
events. The proposed legislation was not passed. There is
a continuing need to address the human element in marine
casualties. Prevention through enforcement is a viable
solution to some human causal factors. Numerous personnel
investigations which should have been initiated following
towing vessel groundings during 1992 and 1993, were not
pursued; despite a presumption of negligence that exists in
grounding cases. Due to the presumption, all groundings,
and particularly those attributed to human factors during a
casualty investigation provide sufficient reason to initiate
a personnel investigation to ascertain if the casualty is
attributable to the operator's action or inaction.
Initiating personnel investigations is necessary to
establish whether remedial action is justified. Failure to
initiate remedial action against a negligent towing vessel
operator's license following a grounding allows the
individual to continue operating under the authority of a
license. when remedial action is not pursued, similar
casualties could reoccur. Therefore, the Coast Guard has
foregone a prime opportunity: to adequately address human
factor in casualties; to preclude similar casualties from
recurring; and, ultimately improve towing vessel safety.
1
2INTRODUCTION
Towboats and tugs registered in the United States have
primarily operated in a domestic trade in and around the
United States. The nature of towing and the inherent
confined operating area places towing vessels in constant
risk of grounding, alliding, or colliding with other
objects. While towing vessels are routinely involved in
groundings and allisions, national attention focuses only on
major marine casualties that: directly impact the
transportation infrastructure; result in mUltiple deaths; or
contribute to environmental harm. This paper will show that
three such focusing events occurred between May 1993 and
January 1994 which raised questions regarding towing vessel
safety and prompted proposals for new legislation. The
Towing Vessel Safety Act of 1993 was introduced as HR 3282
on October 14, 1993 and The Towing Safety Act was introduced
as HR 4058 on March 16, 1994.
This paper will review the proposed legislation to
assess whether the legislation was overdue, prompt,
premature, unnecessary or helpful. Among other things, this
paper will demonstrate that the legislative process involves
many interests: government, industry and the general pUblic.
3This legislative history serves to demonstrate that public
involvement plays a powerful role in the molding of laws
designed to regulate domestic maritime industry.
In addition to reviewing focusing events, legislative
process and public involvement; the paper will provide a
chronological overview of applicable topics, such as;
casualty reporting, casualty investigation, personnel
investigation, personnel remedial action and subsequent
appeal processes. The Coast Guard's marine casualty
reporting and investigation program is established by law
and regulation. The program serves to collect and analyze
casualty statistics. The National Transportation Safety
Board also has a casualty investigation program; however,
this program is designed to investigate casualties which are
focusing events. Both programs identify cornmon causal
factors in casualties which can be addressed to prevent
similar casualties from occurring. This paper will show
that a cornmon causal factor in most casualties is a human
factor. When a grounding or allision occurs, there is a
concurrent presumption of operator negligence. Currently
this negligence is not adequately addressed through the
Coast Guard's existing personnel investigation program. The
presumption that an operator is negligent is well founded in
admiralty law. To determine if negligence can be proven, a
personnel investigation should be initiated following each
grounding or allision. A review of recent grounding
4statistics will indicate that most towing vessel groundings
which were determined to involve human causal factors during
a casualty investigation did not result in subsequent
personnel investigations.
A personnel investigation is conducted to establish the
operator's role in a casualty and to determine if an
administrative action against the licensed vessel operator
is appropriate. The second largest fleet of U.S. commercial
vessels operated is the towing vessel fleet. Some towing
vessels are exempt from requirements for licensed operators.
The vessels are uninspected and not subject to vessel
inspection by the Coast Guard. When licensed operators are
involved in towing vessel casualties they can be held
accountable for their role. This paper will show that
obtaining evidence and identifying witnesses on an
uninspected vessel which will support a presumption of
negligence during an administrative hearing, after a
rebuttal, is a difficult task. Despite the presumption of
negligence, the odds are stacked in favor of negligent
operators and against Coast Guard investigators. Hence
fewer personnel investigations and actions are initiated.
Finally, to improve safety while also easing the
overwhelming burden placed on Coast Guard investigators,
this paper will identify and recommend viable solutions to
the problem which can be implemented immediately without
5additional legislation. A justified proposal for additional
legislation will also be offered which would give Coast
Guard investigators authority to temporarily suspend
licenses.
,
6CHAPTER 1: NEW POLICY STEMS FROM FOCUSING EVENTS
Some marine casualties are incidents of national
significance which open a window of opportunity to pass new
laws. Two recent disasters involving towboats pushing
barges into bridges, resulted in multiple deaths. Another
casualty caused a major oil spill and environmental harm.
Ultimately, the three cases brought increasing legislative
focus on the uninspected towing vessel industry.
On May 28, 1993, the towboat CHRIS pushing the hopper
barge DM3021 struck the Judge Seeber Bridge causing it to
collapse into the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal in New
Orleans, LA. Motorists were crossing the bridge at the time
of the incident. Two injuries and the death of a woman and
her unborn child resulted.!
Another allision occurred on September 22, 1993, when
the towboat MAUVILLA pushing six barges struck a railroad
crossing causing the bridge to collapse into the Big Bayou
1 Boyd, John, IIAMTRAK disaster may be regulatory watershed,1I
The Journal of Commerce, Vol. 398, No. 28,121, December 13,
1993, p. 8A; .
National Transportation Safety Board, Highway-Marlne
Accident Report, U.S. Towboat CHRIS Collision with the
Judge William Seeber Bridge, New Orleans, LA, May 28, 1993,
Adopted June 7, 1994, washington, D.C.
7Canot near Mobile, AL. Shortly after that allision, the
long haul passenger train known as the AMTRAK SUNSET LIMITED
plunged into the water killing forty-seven people. 2
Historians must look back almost 50 years to find a
long haul passenger train wreck which was worse than the
Amtrak disaster. That accident occurred in December 1943,
when an Atlantic Coast Line Railroad train derailed and
collided with another train near Buie, N.C. killing 72
people. Unlike the other two casualties, this incident was
not a marine casualty.3
Just four months after the AMTRAK incident, another
towing vessel accident occurred. This time, the result was
environment degradation in lieu of personnel injuries, death
and structural damage. On January 7, 1994, the tank barge
MORRIS J. BERMAN broke away from the tugboat EMILY, twice.
After the second break away, the tank barge grounded three
hundred yards off San Juan, Puerto Rico. 4 The barge was
2 Boyd, John, "Barges are focus of probe hearing," The
Journal of Commerce, Vol.398, No. 28,121, December 13,
1993, Pp 1A & 8Ai
National Transportation Safety Board, Railroad-Marine
Accident Report, Derailment of Amtrak Train No. 2 on the
CSXT Big Bayou Canot Bridge near Mobile, Alabama,
September 22, 1993, Adopted September 19, 1994,
Washington, D.C.
Watson, Rip and Lawrence H. Kaufman, "Historic Wreck Kills
40, Snarls Freight Trains", The Journal of Commerce,
Vol. 397, No. 28,068, September 23, 1993, Pp 1A & 2A.
4 Abrams, Alan, "Puerto Rico Spill Taps $10 Million From
U.S. Fund," The Journal of Commerce, Vol. 399, No. 28,144,
January 18, 1994, p. 1Bi
8holed while hard aground on a coral reef. The spillage of
750,000 gallons of number 6 oil coated six miles of beach.
This occurred just before peak months for Puerto Rico
tourism. As of March 11, 1994, the cleanup cost approached
$70 million. At that time, approximately $60 million in
cleanup cost was paid by the U. S. oil Spill Liability Trust
Fund. The other $10 million was provided by the barge
owner's insurer. 5
Ironically, tug escorts were identified as a solution
to human factor causes of oil tanker incidents in Valdez,
Alaska when the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 was enacted. Tug
"Food for Thought: American Pie-Spill Shame," Fairplay,
Volume 321, Issue 5748, January 20, 1994, p. 12;
Cantwell, Alice, "Coast Guard Seeks Cause of Puerto Rican
Spill," The Journal of Commerce, Vol. 399, No. 28,141,
January 12, 1994, p. 8B;
Cantwell, Alice, "weather Hinders Cleanup of Puerto Rican
oil Spill," The Journal of Commerce, Vol. 399, No.
28,142, January 13, 1994, p. 8B;
Turner, Kernen, "Cleanup Crews Go In Upper Hand on Oil
Spill Off Puerto Rico," The Journal of Commerce, Vol.
399, No. 28,140, January 11, 1994, p. 8B;
National Transportation Safety Board, Marine Accident
Brief No. DCA94MM008, Washington, D.C., undated;
united States Coast Guard, "Investigation into the
Circumstances Surrounding the Grounding the of Tank barge
MORRIS J. BERMAN at Punta Escambron, Puerto Rico on
January 7, 1994, with Major Pollution and No Personnel
Injuries or Loss of Life", Washington, D.C.,
November 4, 1994.
5 Abrams, Alan, "Oil Still Dirties San Juan Beaches Two
Months After Spill," The Journal of Commerce, Vol. 399,
No. 28,181, March 11, 1994, pp. 1A and 8A;
Abrams, Alan, "Puerto Rico Spill Taps $10 Million From
U. S. Fund," p. 1B;
Abrams, Alan, "U.S. to Get Bill for Spill Cleanup in
Puerto Rico," The Journal of Commerce, Vol. 399, No.
28,143, January 14, 1994, pp. 1A and 8A.
9escorts were to be used as auxiliary propulsion to prevent
tank ships from grounding. Unfortunately, that was not the
case in Puerto Rico where the tug EMILY provided the main
propulsion used to transport the grounded tank barge.
These three accidents were not the only marine
casualties to occur between May 28, 1993 and January 7, 1994
which involved tugs and towboats; however, these were the
focus of public attention. All were subject to
investigation by the Coast Guard and the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). The investigations
determined that there was evidence of negligence on the part
of the licensed operators. 6 The severity of these
casualties caused by human factors provided the impetus for
legislative initiatives discussed in chapter 4. Casualty
reporting and investigation are reviewed in chapter 3.
Prior to delving into casualty investigations and recent
legislative efforts, it is important to become familiar with
five government and industry organizations: U. S. Coast
Guard; NTSB; TSAC; MERPAC and AWO.
6 united States Coast Guard, November 4, 1994, p. 20.
National Transportation Safety Board, June 7, 1994, p. 36;
National Transportation Safety Board, September 19, 1994,
p. 59.
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CHAPTER 2: ORGANIZATION FAMILIARIZATION
U. S. COAST GUARD
Much like "Fortune 500" businesses, the Coast Guard has
a long history of mergers and the acquisition of new
maritime responsibilities. It originated in 1790 when
Congress authorized the construction of ten boats to be used
under the Department of the Treasury to guard against
smugglers. 7 Previously known as the Revenue Marines and
then Revenue Cutter Service, the organization was renamed
the Coast Guard by the Act of January 28, 1915 when it
merged with the Lifesaving Service. 8
The Coast Guard's Marine Safety program is rooted in
1838 as the Steamboat Inspection Service. Congress enacted
legislation to preserve and protect the public from
preventable accidents. Subsequent to the sinking of the
S.S. TITANIC, the Steamboat Inspection Service was moved
under the new Department of Commerce. After merging with
the Bureau of Navigation and reorganization, it was
eventually renamed the Bureau of Inspection and Navigation.
The Coast Guard absorbed responsibility for the Bureau of
7 Smith, Horatio D., "Early History of the United States
Revenue Marine Service or (United States Revenue Cutter
Service) 1789-1849", A Coast Guard Bicentennial
Publication, Washington, D.C., 1989, p. 1.
8 Browning, Dr. Robert M.,"Moments in History", U.S. Coast
Guard Public Affairs Staff, Washington, D.C., p. 24
11
Inspection and Navigation in 1946. 9 Concluding 177 years in
the Treasury Department, the Coast Guard was transferred to
the newly created Department of Transportation on April 1,
1967. 10
On February 18, 1871, Congress enacted 16 Stat. 440 to
reorganize the Steamboat Inspection Service. That statute
defined the types, duties and hierarchy of marine
inspectors. The hierarchy included the Board of Local
Inspectors who were empowered and required to investigate
acts of incompetence and misconduct committed by licensed
officers while acting under the authority of their licenses,
and to revoke or suspend such license if any provision of
applicable law had been violated. The present day
responsibilities of the Board of Local Inspectors is vested
in the Officer in Charge of Marine Inspection. 1 To provide
immediate direction to Coast Guard law enforcement
activities within an assigned area, the Commandant may
9 Johnson, Robert E., "Guardians of the Sea: History of the
u.S. Coast Guard 1915 to present", Naval Institute Press,
Annapolis, Maryland, 1988, p. 19 & 22;
Eldridge, F. R., "Historical Sketch of the u.S. Coast
Guard 1790-1946", U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters,
Washington, D.C., reprinted July, 1953, p. 38.
10 Johnson, p. 343.
11 U. S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Manual Volume I,
Administration and Management, COMDTINST M16000.6,
Washington, D.C., May 5, 1986 as amended through
February 8, 1995, p. 2-6 and 2-7.
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designate any officer as Captain of the Port. 12 More will
be said about Captain of the Port Authority and current
Coast Guard investigation initiatives.
RATIORAL TRANSPORTATIOR SAFETY BOARD
Previously it was mentioned that both the Coast Guard
and the NTSB investigated the maritime focusing events. The
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an
independent agency of the United States. 13 The board was
created twenty years ago under the Independent Safety Board
Act of 1974 (49 U.S.C. app. 1901) .14 NTSB's primary
function is to promote safety in transportation. I5 The
organization and functions of the Board and delegations of
authority are outlined in Title 49 Code of Federal
Regulations Part 800.
"The Board consists of five Members appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate.
One of the Members is designated by the President as
Chairman with the advice and consent of the Senate, and
one as Vice Chairman." 16
12 Title 14 United States Code 634(a)
13 Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations Section 800.2.
14 Title 49 united States Code app. 1901;
U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Manual Volume V,
Investigations, COMDTINST M16000.10, Chapter 3, B. 16,
waShington, D.C., February 27, 1989.
15 Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations Section 800.3(a).
16 Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations, Section 800.2.
13
"The Board's staff is comprised of the following
principal components: Office of the Managing Director;
Office of Governmen~ and Public Affairs; Office of the
General Counsel; Office of Administrative Law Judges,;
which conducts all formal proceedings arising under the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958; the Bureau of Accident
Investigation, which conducts investigations of all
major transportation accidents and other marine,
pipeline, and hazardous materials accidents within the
Board's jurisdiction; the Bureau of Field Operations;
the Bureau of Technology, which provides technical
advice and services, conducts research, and carries out
analytical studies and tests on all aspects of the
Board's accident investigation, accident prevention,
and safety promotion activities, including safety
recommendations, studies, and special investigations;
the Bureau of Safety Programs; and the Bureau of
Administration. "17
TOWING INDUSTRY
The towing industry consist of more than 6,200 towing
vessels of various sizes; employing more than 32,000 crew
persons. L8 Towing vessels constitute the second largest
population of self-propelled vessels in the U. S. commercial
fleet, after fishing vessels. 9 There are many modes of
towing and each mode may involve tugs and towboats of
17 Ibid.
18 Evaluation of Casualty Incidents for the u.S. Towing
Industry 1981 - 1990, Prepared for the American waterways
Operators by Mercer Management Consulting Inc., Lexington,
MA, August 10, 1994, p. 11-1.
19 Ibid.
14
varying designs, sizes and capabilities. Furthermore,
towing configurations may differ depending upon the service
provided. 20
Tugs may be used to provide vessel escort and assist
ships with docking or undocking. others may be employed in
the offshore oil industry carrying equipment and supplies or
moving specially equipped barges. Salvage tugs serve to
provide a remedy for vessels that are aground and stranded;
involved in fire; in danger of sinking; or have suffered a
loss of power or steering. Yet others simply deliver cargo
between ports. 21 More than 2,870 tugboats operate in
harbor, bays, the Great Lakes and upon the oceans. 22
Another 3,350 towboats push barges along the inland
waterways.23
A towing vessel's crew size is determined by the
operating company, except that most towing vessels over 26
feet in length must be operated by a person licensed to
operate that type of vessel in the particular geographic
area, under prescribed regulation. 24 As bizarre as this may
20 Brady, Edward M., Tugs, Towboats and Towing, Cornell
Maritime Press, Inc., Cambridge, Maryland, 1967, p. 1, 21,
107 and 141.
21 Reid, George H., Primer of Towing, Cornell Maritime
Press, Centreville, Maryland, 1992, p. 146, 174, 179.
i.2 Evaluation of Casualty Incidents for the u.S. Towing
Industry 1981 - 1990, p. 11-1.
23 Ibid.
24 Title 46 united States Code Section 8904(a).
15
seem, towing vessels of less than 200 gross tons engaged in
the offshore oil industry are exempt from requirements for
licensed operators if the vessel has offshore mineral and
oil industry sites or equipment as its ultimate
destination. 25 The number of towing vessels operated
without licenses under the exemption is unknown.
Licensing exemptions are not the only oddity.
Following the derailment of the SUNSET LIMITED, an
Associated Press headline stated, "Towboat Pilot In Worst
Amtrak Disaster Failed Exam Seven Times". 26 There was no
limit as to the number of times an individual could retake a
failed exam to obtain an operator's license. Did it matter?
After all, some towing vessel operators were not required to
be licensed at all. What would the headlines have said
about a casualty involving a towboat operator without a
license? The news of such a casualty might be as disturbing
as the MAUVILLA's involvement with the derailed SUNSET
LIMITED. Additionally, it may be equally unacceptable to
learn that federal law and regulation exempted some towing
vessel operators from licensing requirements. 27 Following
the AMTRAK incident, the Towing Vessel Safety Act of 1993
proposed equipping towing vessels with radar and other
25 Title 46 united States Code Section 8905(a).
26 Associated Press, "pilot in Amtrak Disaster Failed Test
Seven Times", The Journal of Commerce, Vol. 399, No
28,158, February 7, 1994.
27 Title 46 united States Code Chapter 89.
16
navigational safety equipment. It seems reasonable to
believe that an unlicensed operator may lack the necessary
skills to use the proposed radars and other navigation
safety equipment. Perhaps a review of recently proposed
towing vessel safety legislation will shed some light on how
industry influences legislation and how these loopholes
evolve. 28 The timing and necessity for the Towing Vessel
Safety Act will be discussed in greater detail.
Towing vessels are prone to be involved in marine
casualties. Currently, an operator's work hours may be
limited by law; however, the hours may differ depending upon
the length of the voyage, area of operation or existing
emergencies. The towing industry's crew personnel account
for nearly 90 million on-duty hours. 29 In the united
States, towing vessels move 32,000 barges used to transport
750 million tons of cargo annually.30 Additionally, tugs
are used to assist more than 110,000 ships in vicinity of
u. S. ports. 31 The only constant condition in towing seems
to be the hazards involved. The height, width and length of
tow may change regularly in a single trip. The very nature
of towing involves making frequent contact with other self-
28 Title 46 united States Code Section 8104.
29 Evaluation of Casualty Incidents for the u.s. Towing
Industry 1981 - 1990, p. 11-1 and 11-2.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
17
propelled and non-propelled vessels or fixed structures. 32
Adding to the risk of casualty is an unfriendly operating
environment. Towing requires continuous maneuvering of
varying size tows in waterways that are highly restrictive.
Obstacles and elements which must be overcome include:
narrow channel widths, shallow channel depths; bends in the
channel; high winds; river currents; tidal currents;
restricted visibility; passing other tows or ships; bridges;
and, other shoreside structures. 33 In 1981, it was
estimated that there were 25,543 miles of waterway usable
for commercial navigation in the United States. 34 only
4,666 miles had a depth of 14 feet and over. 3S The Army
Corps of Engineers determined that 9,868 miles had a depth
of 9 feet and less. 36 The overall setting is ripe for
groundings, allisions and collisions. Between 1981 and
1990, groundings and collisions accounted for 75% of all
towing vessel casualties. 37
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid., p. V-8.
34 Waterways of the united States Chart, Compiled from
information supplied by the Corps of Engineers, u.S. Army,
Published by the American Waterways Operators, Inc., 1981.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Evaluation of Casualty Incidents for the Towing Industry
1981-1990, p. 111-5.
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The towing vessel safety regulation is based upon
registered length. Personnel licensing is based upon a
vessel's registered gross tonnage. On the other hand, towing
is marketed using a vessel's horsepower. This assumes that
the greater the horsepower, the greater the tug's capability
compared to tugs with lesser horsepower ratings. Hence,
charges for a tug are also based upon the horsepower
provided. Unfortunately, there are a variety of methods
used to measure horsepower. Tug owners have a tendency to
list their vessels using the highest figures attainable.
After all, it is in their best economic interest to do so.
In the United States, the strength of a tug may be
listed as either the number of tons bollard pull, indicated
horsepower or brake horsepower. Bollard pull means that one
ton of pull equals 100 horsepower. "Horsepower comes from
the steam engine, whose power was found through a system
known as taking and reading of indicator cards."38 Brake
horsepower is a reading taken when the engine is new and on
a manufacturer's test block. Owners often choose to use an
engine manufacturer's full power and no load test results.
A bollard pull test certificate issued for tugs by
classification societies may be the best measurement,
provided that each society uses a uniform set of criteria.
Det Norske Veritas (DNV) uses a bollard pull test which
38 Blank, John S., Modern Towing, Cornell Maritime Press,
Inc., centreville, Maryland, 1989, p. 123 - 124.
19
stipulates that a continuous bollard pull be maintained for
at least 10 to 15 minutes to determine the tug's true
pulling power. 39 While each towing industry is in economic
competition with similar businesses, the diverse industry's
overlapping interest and concerns are addressed in a
cooperative approach by the American Waterways operators.
THE AMERICAN WATERWAYS OPERATORS (AWO)
The American Waterways Operators (AWO) is a national
trade association which represents the inland and coastal
barge and towing industry in addition to small and medium
sized shipyards which build and repair tugs, barges and
other vessels. AWO serves the interest of the domestic
commercial navigation industry. "Association membership is
comprised of more than 300 member companies, including bulk
commodity transportation; fleeting and harbor service
operators; fueling, bunkering, and lightering service
operators; second-tier domestic shipyards; and affiliated
service members. ,,40
AWO was organized in 1944 in Washington, D.C. to
represent the inland barge and towing industry. In 1969,
the mission and scope were expanded to include the coastal
39 Ibid.
40 American Waterways Operators, Facts at a Glance, undated.
20
sector of the industry. The American waterways Shipyard
Conference (AWSC), which represents the interests of U.S.
commercial shipyards, was organized within AWO in 1978.
"AWO is a member-driven organization. ,,41 In 1993, the
Board of Directors consisted of 50 members. Fourteen of the
members serve as the AWO Executive Committee. There are a
total of six AWO committees. Four standing committees
address the issues of concern to particular industry
segments. The Inland Dry Sector Committee identifies the
issues affecting dry cargo carriers and emphasizes the
regional, national, and international role of dry cargo
carriers by providing safe, economical, efficient, and
environmentally sound bulk transportation.
The Inland Liquid Sector Committee represents the
legislative, regulatory, and public interests of tank barge
operators throughout the U. S. The Coastal Sector Committee
has focused on GATT negotiations, as well as responding to
Coast Guard proposals for structural and operational
modifications to existing single-hulled tank vessels over
5,000 gross tons. The Harbor Services Sector Committee has
dealt with federal rulemaking for tug escorts which are
mandated by the oil Pollution Act of 1990. Additionally,
the Common Issues Council (CIC) focuses on issues which
cross committee boundaries. The Public Affairs Committee
develops media and public strategies to support the
41 Ibid., undated.
21
Association's regulatory and legislative initiatives. 42
Another organization which represents the towing industry's
interest within federal government is the Towing Vessel
Safety Advisory Committee.
TOWING VESSEL SAFETY ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Congress authorized "the establishment of a system
governing the creation and operation of advisory committees
in the executive branch of the Federal Government."o As
noted in Public Law 92-463, Congress found that there were
numerous committees, boards, commissions, councils, and
similar groups which were established to advise officers and
agencies in the executive branch of the Federal Government.
It was recognized that they were frequently a useful and
beneficial means of furnishing expert advice, ideas, and
diverse opinions to the Federal Government.
The Congress further found and declared that --
"(1) the need for many existing advisory committees had
not been adequately reviewed;
(2) new advisory committees should be established only
when they are determined to be essential and their
number should be kept to the minimum necessary;
(3) advisory committees should be terminated when they
are no longer carrying out the purposes for which they
were established;
(4) standards and uniform procedures should govern the
establishment, operation, administration, and duration
of advisory committees;
42 American Waterways Operators, 1993 Annual Report,
undated, pp. 7-9.
43 Public Law 92-463, Section 2, October 6, 1972.
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(5) the Congress and the pUblic should be kept informed
with respect to the number, purpose, membership,
activities, and cost of advisory committees; and
(6) the function of advisory committees should be
advisory only, and that all matters under their
consideration should be determined, in accordance with
law, by the official, agency, or officer involved." 44
The Towing Vessel Safety Advisory Committee (TSAC) was
established subsequent to the enactment of Public Law 92-380
on October 6, 1980. 45 The Committee was to be terminated on
September 30, 1990. This termination date was extended by
Public Law 101-225 to September 30, 1995 at which time the
Committee shall be terminated unless extended by subsequent
Act of Congress. 46
TSAC is codified within Title 33 united States Code
1231 which is known as the Ports and Waterways Safety Act.
The Committee consists of sixteen members with particular
expertise, knowledge, and experience regarding shallow-draft
inland and coastal waterway navigation and towing safety as
follows:
(1) seven members from the barge and towing industry,
reflecting a regional geographic balance;
(2) one member from the offshore mineral and oil supply
vessel industry; and
44 Ibid.
45 Public Law 96-380, October 6, 1980.
46 Public Law 101-225, Title I Section 105(b), December 12,
1989.
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(3) two members from each of the following:
(a) port districts, authorities, or terminal
operators;
(b) maritime labor;
(c) shippers (of whom at least one shall be engaged
in the shipment of oil or hazardous materials by
barge); and
(d) the general public.
The members of the Committee are appointed by the
Secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard is
operating. Currently, the Coast Guard operates under the
Secretary of Transportation. Upon request by the Secretary
of Transportation, the Secretary of the Army and the
Secretary of Commerce may designate representatives to
participate as observers on the Committee.
Both the Committee and Secretary of Transportation have
been delegated responsibilities by law. "The Committee
shall advise, consult with, and make recommendations to the
Secretary on matters relating to shallow-draft inland and
coastal waterway navigation and towing safety."n
Additionally, "the Secretary shall consult with the
Committee before taking any significant action affecting
shallow-draft inland and coastal waterway navigation and
towing safety. ,,48 The Committee is also "authorized to make
47 Title 33 united States Code Section 1232a.
48 Ibid.
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available to Congress any information, advice, and
recommendations which the Committee is authorized to give to
the Secretary. ,,49
The Towing Safety Advisory Committee has a mission
statement which states that:
"TSAC's mission is to work in partnership with the
U. S. Coast Guard in order to:
1. help ensure a safe, environmentally responsible,
and productive industry;
2. Ensure sound pUblic policy through reasonable and
enforceable regulation;
3. Proactively identify significant issues which
deserve attention; and
4. Integrate private sector expertise into the
governmental process to help the Coast Guard
accomplish its missions." 50
The Coast Guard is designated as the sponsor and agency
providing support. TSAC reports to the Secretary of
Transportation through its sponsor. 51 Not all federal
advisory committees are established by an Act of Congress.
MERCHANT VESSEL PERSONNEL ADVISORY COMMITTEE (MERPAC)
Unlike TSAC, the Merchant Vessel Personnel Advisory
Committee (MERPAC) was established at the request of the
49 Ibid.
50 U.S. Department of Transportation, United States Coast
Guard, TSAC Member Handbook, May 1993, no page numbers.
51 U.S. Department of Transportation, Charter, Towing Safety
Advisory Committee, pursuant to Federal Advisory Committee
Act, washington, D.C., Filed May 19, 1993.
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Commandant of the Coast Guard. 52 The committee has no
operating authority or responsibility. MERPAC serves as a
IIdeliberative body to advise the Secretary of Transportation
via the Commandant on matters ll53 IIconcerning personnel in
the U.S. merchant marine, including but not limited to:
training, qualifications, certification documentation and
fitness standards. 11 54 The committee is designed to consist
of no more than 19 members, from the following groups:
lIa. Nine active U.S. merchant mariners, including:
(1) three deck officers two of whom shall be
licensed for oceans any gross tons, one whom shall
be licensed for inland or river route with a
limited or unlimited tonnage, two of whom must
have masters or operators of uninspected towing
vessel (OUTV) licenses, and one of who must have
significant tanker experience; and, to the extent
practicable, one of these deck officers should
represent the point of view of labor and another
should represent a management perspective;
(2) three engineering officers two of whom shall
be licensed as chief engineer any horsepower, one
of whom shall be licensed as either a limited
chief engineer or a designated duty engineer; and,
to the extent practicable, one of these engineers
should represent a labor point of view and another
should represent a management perspective;
(3) two unlicensed seaman, including one Able
Bodied Seaman, and one Qualified Member of the
Engine Department; and
(4) one Pilot.
52 U.S. Department of Transportation, United States Coast
Guard, Merchant Vessel Personnel Advisory
Committee Handbook, Washington, D.C., June 1994,
no page numbers.
53 U.S. Department of Transportation, Charter, Merchant
Marine Personnel Advisory Committee, pursuant to Federal
Advisory Committee Act, washington, D.C., Filed January
24, 1994 as amended December 6, 1994, p. 1.
54 Ibid.
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b. six marine educators, including
(1) three from Maritime Academies, two of whom
shall be associated with State Maritime Academies;
and
(2) three from other maritime training
institutions, one of whom should be associated
with the small vessel industry.
c. two individuals from shipping companies employed
in ship operation management.
d. two from the general public."55
Since the committee was not established by an act of
Congress, the charter remains in effect for only two years
unless terminated sooner. 56
MERPAC's third meeting was held on June 15, 1994. The
minutes of that meeting indicated the existence of a Towing
Vessel Safety Group. 57
Even though the Committee was not established by an Act
of Congress, it is governed by the Federal Advisory
Committee Act. Unlike TSAC, MERPAC does not have the
authority to report directly to Congress. The Act states
that: "Unless otherwise specifically provided by statute or
Presidential directive, advisory committees shall be
utilized solely for advisory functions. Determinations of
action to be taken and policy to be expressed with respect
55 Ibid., p. 2 & 3.
56 Ibid., p. 4 ;
Public Law 92-463, Section 14 (a)(2), October 6, 1972.
57 Minutes of the Merchant Marine Personnel Advisory
Committee, Meeting Wednesday, June 15, 1994, Washington,
D.C., p. 6 through 9.
27
to matters upon which an advisory committee reports shall be
made solely by the President or an officer of the Federal
Government. ,,58
Having completed a brief introduction to the five
organizations who focus on towing vessel safety issues, it
is time to address towing vessel safety in a sequential
order of events occurring after a towing vessel casualty
happens; starting with casualty reporting, investigation and
follow-on statistics.
58 Public Law 92-463, section 9(b).
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CHAPTER 3: CASUALTY REPORTING, INVESTIGATION & STATISTICS
MARINE CASUALTY REPORTING
Specified marine casualties must be reported to the
Coast Guard by the towing vessel industry. Title 46 U. S.
Code Section 6101 provides the authority for the Coast Guard
to require notice and reporting of marine casualties. 59 The
implementing regulations are found in Title 46 Code of
Federal Regulations Part 4. They require giving notice as
soon as possible and submission of a written report of
casualties within five days to the Coast Guard. GO
Reportable casualties include:
n(a) all accidental groundings and any intentional
grounding which also meets any of the other reporting
criteria or creates a hazard to navigation, the
environment, or the safety of the vessel;
the death of an individual; serious injury to an
individual; material loss of property; or material
damage affecting the seaworthiness or efficiency of the
vessel.
(b) Loss of main propulsion or primary steering, or any
associated component or control system, the loss of
which causes a reduction of the maneuvering
capabilities of the vessel. Loss means that systems,
component parts, sub-systems, or control systems do not
perform the specified or required function;
(c) An occurrence materially and adversely affecting
the vessels seaworthiness or fitness for service or
route, including but not limited to fire, flooding, or
failure or damage to fixed fire extinguishing systems,
lifesaving equipment, auxiliary power generating
equipment, or bilge pumping systems;
(d) Loss of life;
59 Title 46 united States Code section 6101.
60 Title 46 Code of Federal Regulations Sections 4.05-1 and
4.05-10
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(e) Injury which requires professional medical
treatment beyond first aid and, in the case of a person
engaged or employed on board a vessel in commercial
service, which renders the individual unfit to perform
routine vessel duties.
(f) An occurrence not meeting any of the above criteria
but resulting in damage to property in excess of
$25,000. Damage cost includes the cost of labor and
material to restore the property to the service
condition which existed prior to the casualty, but does
not include the cost of salvage, cleaning, gas freeing,
drydocking or demurrage. ,,61
Upon receipt of information of a marine casualty or
accident, an investigation is initiated "as may be necessary
in accordance with the regulations.,,62
MARINE CASUALTY INVESTIGATION
"The degree of formality in unit level investigations
varies, from a formal investigation that follows marine
board procedures to a simple review of the notice of marine
casualty. ,,6 "Procedures for routine investigations are
dependent upon the significance of the case and the
availability of witnesses and resources.,,64 Routine
investigations are not always conducted on scene. "Facts
may be elicited by correspondence, telephone or personal
interviews, signed or unsigned statements, interrogatories
61 Title 46 Code of Federal Regulations Section 4.05-1
62 U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Manual Volume V,
Chapter 3.D.1,
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
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that mayor may not be taken under oath, or other means" 65
before or after written notification of the casualty has
been received. The Marine Safety Information System (MSIS)
is a database maintained by the Coast Guard as required by
Title 46 united States Code Section 3717. 66 Among other
things, MSIS is "designed to capture and report basic data
relevant to marine casualty investigations". 67 Unlike a
focusing event, most casualties are not a unique event.
However, a history "may suggest a pattern involving repeated
vessel or equipment failures. Investigators should use the
information available in MSIS to uncover repeat occurrences
or patterns of similar casualty incidents. ,,68
Prior to May 1992, investigations were conducted to
determine the apparent cause of the casualty. Apparent
cause implied "a simple statement of how and why the
casualty occurred, without regard to the more restrictive
connotation of proximate cause.,,69 The apparent cause of
the casualty was electronically filed by the Coast Guard in
a computer database known as CASMAIN between 1981 and 1992.
A new database known as the Marine Investigation Module
65 Ibid.
66 Title 46 United States Code Section 3717.
67 U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Manual Volume V,
Chapter 3.B.5, February 27, 1989.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid., Chapter 3. E . 1. e .
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(MINMOD) provides improved capability to understand the
interrelationship of mUltiple causal-enabling factors which
result in marine casualties, including human factors. 7o
MINMOD 1S a product within the Marine Safety Information
System. 71
A standard classification scheme provides a structure
to data collection and may provide some consistency across
investigations. 72 This suggests that the apparent cause of
a casualty as determined by each of these routine
investigations is later provided equal credence in the
Marine Safety Information System even though the degree of
inquiry and accuracy of the facts may vary considerably.
The u. S. Coast Guard and the National Transportation
Safety Board share responsibility to investigate marine
casualties. Coast Guard investigations are conducted to
determine the cause of the casualty under Title 46 u. S.
70 Booth, Richard L., "Human Factors Study Staff
Memorandum", u. S. Coast Guard Marine Investigations
Division, Washington, D.C., February 23, 1994.
71 Byers, James C., Susan G. Hill and Anita M. Ruthblum,
"u.S. Coast Guard Marine Investigation and Reporting:
Analysis and Recommendations for Improvement", Interim
Report prepared for u.S. Coast Guard, available through
National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA,
August 1994.
72 Booth, Richard L., Susan G. Hill, James C. Byers and
Anita Rothblum, "Gathering and Recording Human-Related
Causal Data in Marine and other Accident Investigations",
Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society
38th Annual Meeting, Vol. 2, Santa Monica, CA, July 14,
1994, p. 5.
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Code Chapter 63. 73 Coast Guard authority to investigate
marine casualties involving any ship on U. S. navigable
waters or any U. S. ship operating anywhere is provided by
Title 46 Code of Federal Regulations Section 4.07-5. 74 The
National Transportation Safety Board may investigate, or
cause to be investigated, major marine casualties and
casualties involving pUblic and nonpublic vessels. It may
also investigate any "other accident which occurs in
connection with the transportation of people or property
which, in the judgement of the Board, is catastrophic,
involves problems of a recurring character, or would
otherwise carry out the policy"75 of the Act.
The National Transportation Safety Board has
responsibility to conduct investigations of major marine
casualties and certain public/nonpublic vessel casualties.
Therefore, the Commandant of the Coast Guard must notify the
National Transportation Safety Board when a preliminary
investigation reveals that a casualty meets one of the
following criteria:
(1) A major marine casualty which involves a vessel
other than a public vessel and results in the loss
of six or more lives: the loss of a mechanically-
73 Title 46 united States Code Chapter 63.
74 Title 46 Code of Federal Regulations Section 4.07-5.
75 U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Manual Volume V,
Chapter 3.B.16.
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propelled vessel of 100 or more gross tons;
property damage initially estimated at $500,000 or
more; or is a serious threat to life, property, or
the marine environment by hazardous materials.
(2) Involves a public and a nonpublic vessel and at
least one fatality or $75,000 in property damage.
When requested by the NTSB, the Coast Guard conducts these
investigations on behalf of the NTSB. 76 Joint regulations of
the National Transportation Board and the Coast Guard for
the investigation of marine casualties is found in Title 49
Code of Federal Regulations Part 850. "The Coast Guard's
responsibility to investigate marine casualties is not
eliminated or diminished by the regulations".?? Where the
Coast Guard has responsibility "under R.S. 4450 (46 USC
239)" the proceedings are conducted independently, but so as
to avoid duplication. 78
Currently, reference made to 46 USC 239 in the text of
49 CFR 850 is erroneous. This reference has been outdated
for more than 11 years. On August 26, 1983, Title 46 USC
239 was revised and recodified by Public Law 98-89. RS 4450
76 U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Manual, Volume V,
Chapter 3.A.2.
77 Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations Part 850.
18 Ibid., Section 850.3.
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is now codified under Title 46 USC Sections 7701 to 7705. 79
"Responsibility under RS 4450 (46 USC 239)"80 now equates to
the responsibility to conduct personnel investigations and
suspension and revocation proceedings under Title 46 USC
Chapter 77.
Essentially any marine casualty involving u. S. vessels
manned by licensed personnel and/or the holder of a merchant
mariner's document has the potential to result in a
personnel investigation. Dependent upon the findings in
that investigation, a personnel investigation may
subsequently result in suspension and revocation action
against licenses, certificates of registry and merchant
mariner documents under 46 USC Chapter 77. This means that
any casualty involving a u. S. vessel should be conducted
independently by the Coast Guard. Personnel investigations
and suspension and revocation action will be discussed in
Chapter 5.
SELECTED RECENT CASUALTY STATISTICS (1992-1993)
The MINMOD database shows that a combined two year
total of 24,335 reportable marine casualties involving shore
facilities and vessels occurred in the united States between
79 Title 46 USCA Shipping, Table I showing disposition of
all sections of Title 46, 1990 Pamphlet, West Publishing
Company, St Paul, Minn, p. XIX.
80 Ibid.
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1992 and 1993. 81 There were 17,869 vessel casualties of
which 14,390 involved u. s. vessels. 82 Earlier it was
reported that 6,200 U. S. towing vessels are in operation.
Towing vessels accounted for 2,647 of the 14,930 reported
u. s. vessel casualties. 83
Groundings accounted for 1,977 or 14% of the 14,390
casualties involving u. S. vessels. 84 Towing vessels were
involved in 763 or 39% of the 1,977 groundings involving
u. S. vessels in u. S. waters. 8j Human factors were a
causal factor in 1,583 or 80% of the 1,977 groundings
involving all types of u. S. vessels. s6 Human Factors were
a causal factor in 600 or 79% of the 763 groundings
involving u. S. towing vessels in u. S. waters. 87 This
indicates that nearly 5% of the towing vessel population was
involved in groundings where human factors were a causal
factor in 1992 and 1993. When an accidental grounding
occurs, a presumption of negligence exist. Groundings and a
presumption of negligence will be addressed in chapter 5.
81 U.S. Coast Guard, Commandant (G-MMI-3), u.S. Coast Guard
letter 16732 to LCDR Paul Cormier, December 5, 1994.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
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HUMAN FACTORS
Thus far, reference to human factors was undefined.
Within vessel operations, a human factor is defined as "a
manned action that should have been done which either was
not done or not done properly, or a manned action that
should not have been done, but was. ,,88 "Human Factors is
also the design of equipment, work environments, and
procedures so as to make them compatible with human
capabilities and limitations. ,,89
The American Bureau of Shipping reports that:
" ... In almost all cases, the initiating event of
catastrophic accidents can be traced to compounding of
human and organizational errors.
There are a number of factors that can result in
human errors, ranging from willful acts or omissions to
a lack of adequate experience, training, knowledge, or
communication. These errors are magnified and
compounded in times of stress and panic. Human
performance levels vary between individuals depending
upon knowledge, attitude, and training, organizational
dynamics and pressures, and the complexity of the
system which they are operating. Performance
deteriorates when pressure levels are either too low or
too high. In addition, errors are influenced by
cultural and moral values, management responsibilities,
individual training, and ~ntegrity. ,,90
88 Booth, "Human Factors Study Staff Memorandum", p. 2.
89 Ibid.
90 Moore, William H. and Steven R. McIntyre, The Human
Element in Marine Safety, Surveyor, volume 25, Number 2,
Democrat Press, Inc., June, 1994, p. 7.
37
American Waterways Operator's extracted and analyzed
13,154 towing vessel casualties from CASMAIN which occurred
between 1981 and 1990. That study indicated that 7,628 or
58% of the cases had personnel related causes. 9l
The top 10 personnel related causes of towing vessel
casualties were: Operator Error, Error in Judgment, Failed
to Account for Current, Failed to Ascertain Position,
Inattention to Duty, Failed to Establish passing Agreement,
Improper Mooring/Towing, Carelessness, Failed to Account for
Tide/River Segment, and Failed to Keep Proper Lookout.;L
These personnel-related causes accounted for ninety percent
of all personnel-related causes.
The Marine Safety Information System MINMOD provides
the decision support and reporting mechanism for the basic
elements of the Marine Casualty Program. ~ There are four
causal or enabling factors that are those combination of
factors that either cause or enable a casualty to occur:
equipment factors; hazardous materials; operating
environmental factors; and human factors. These factors
91 Evaluation of Casualty Incidents for the u.S. Towing
Industry 1981-1990, Exhibit III-3, p. III-6
9L Ibid.
93 U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Manual, Volume V,
Chapter 3.B.5.a, Pp. 3-11.
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explain why a casualty happened. 94 The Marine Investigation
Module's Marine Casualty Human Factors Supplement is used to
capture information on the human element. Specific classes
of human factors include: communication, knowledge,
proficiency, management practice, mental influences,
physical influences, compliance with rules, regulations, and
policy, equipment status signals, and indicators. These
factors are used to further describe why an incident
occurred. 95
Each of the eight human factor classes has a specific
subclass.
CLASS: COMMUNICATION
Subclass: Clarity
Language
Phraseology
CLASS: KNOWLEDGE/PROFICIENCY
Subclass: Damage Control
Draft/Air Draft
Emergency Procedures
General Knowledge
Job/Task Responsibility
Maneuvering
Route/Environment
Rules, Regulations Policies
Stability/Trim
System/Equipment Operations
Vessel Operations
94 U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Information System, Draft
Marine Casualty Guide, revised December 4, 1994, provided
by Mr Jim Law, U.S. Coast Guard Office of Marine Safety,
Security and Environmental Protection, Marine Casualty
Investigation Division, Washington, D.C., p. 98.
95 United States Coast Guard, Marine Investigation Module,
Draft Guide to Coded Fields, February 16, 1994, provided
by Mr Jim Law, Coast Guard Office of Marine Safety,
Security and Environmental Protection, Marine
Investigation Division, washington, D.C., pp. 131-140.
CLASS: MANAGEMENT
Subclass: Discipline
Job Description
Personnel Coordination
Personal Qualifications
Personal Sufficiency
Personnel-Task Match
Personnel Training Policy
Supervision
Task Loading
Tests/Drills
CLASS: MENTAL INFLUENCE
Subclass: Anxiety
Apprehension
Boredom
Complacency
Deliberate Misaction
Distraction
Equipment Confidence
Expectancy
Habit Interference
Inattention
Interpersonal Relationships
Mental Capacity
Management-Induced Pressure
Motivation
Panic
perception
Self-Confidence
Self-Discipline
Self-Induced Pressure
CLASS: PHYSICAL INFLUENCE
Subclass: Alcohol
Chronic Fatigue
Drugs
Hearing Problem
Medication
Illness
Short-Term Fatigue
Toxic Substance
Visual Problem
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CLASS: RULES,
Subclass:
REGULATIONS, POLICY
Availability
Clarity
Currency
Sufficiency
CLASS: STATUS
Subclass:
OF SIGNALS/INDICATORS
Accuracy
Clarity
Consistency
Credibility
Discrimination
Resolution"'''
40
Many would agree that "it is time to deal with the fact
that human error is a major factor in 80 to 85 percent of
all vessel casualties. ,,97
COAST GUARD CASUALTY PREVENTION AND RESPONSE
The primary purpose of conducting marine casualty
investigations is to obtain information that can be used to
prevent similar casualties from occurring, as far as
practicable. The process of preventing casualties was
illustrated by the Business Plan for the Coast Guard's
marine safety, security and environmental protection
program. The plan identified two strategic goals:
(1) "Eliminate deaths, injuries, and economic loss
associated with commercial and military marine
transportation. "98
96 Ibid.
97 Novak, Bruce, "Cleaner Seas and Safer Ships . . . through
maritime regulatory reform", proceedings of the Marine
Safety Council, Volume 51, NO.5, Washington, D.C.,
September-October, 1994, p. 11.
9B U.S. Coast Guard Business Plan for Marine Safety,
Security and Environmental Protection, COMDTINST 16000.26,
Washington, D.C., January 26, 1994.
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(2) "Eliminate environmental damage associated with
marine transportation." 99
The goals were to be achieved through response and
prevention. The field model for goal achievement through a
response mode involved:
(1) detection and surveillance as a means of finding
out about pollution as well as significant
operational risks, to permit quick response and
mitigation.
(2) response when the safety system fails and accidents
are not prevented
(3) conducting investigations to provide principle
feedback on casualties
(4) targeting and analyzing different populations based
upon industry composition and risk on a local and
regional level.
There was also a field model for goal achievement
through a prevention mode which included: education,
inspection, enforcement and analysis. Enforcement action
included personnel investigation and subsequent action.
Furthermore, the Coast Guard headquarters' model for goal
achievement is a program management mode. It overlaps the
field model at the analyze step where national risk are
targeted, in lieu of local and regional. Following
analysis, standards are developed, policy and operational
support are coordinated, and resources are allocated to
99 Ibid.
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address both the response and prevention modes in the field
model. The primary purpose of conducting marine casualty
investigations and the Coast Guard business plan appear to
have been overlooked by the 103rd congress when the Towing
Vessel Safety Act was proposed.
CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION OF CASUALTIES
The 103rd Congress included a House Committee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries. Subordinate to the Committee
were five subcommittees: (1) Coast Guard and Navigation;
(2) Environment and Natural Resources; (3) Fisheries
Management; (4) Merchant Marine; and, (5) Oceanography, Gulf
of Mexico, and the outer Continental Shelf. At the time of
the aforementioned focusing events, Representative Tauzin
was the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and
Navigation. 100 Congress previously mandated that they
receive notification of major marine casualties. Title 46
U. S. Code Section 6307 requires that the Secretary notify
Congress of any hearing conducted to investigate a major
marine casualty involving death. l01 It is not clear how or
when Congress was notified about the aforementioned
disasters in 1993, but it is self evident that some form of
notification did occur. On October 12, 1993, the
subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation conducted a
hearing to investigate inland tug and barge safety. The
100 Congressional Index, 103rd Congress 1993 - 1994, Vol. 2,
Commerce Clearing House, Inc. 1993.
101 Title 46 United States Code Section 6307.
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investigation is referred to as "the subcommittee's
investigation of the AMTRAK SUNSET LIMITED tragedy. ,,102
On October 14, 1993, Representative Tauzin introduced
the Towing vessel Navigation Safety Act of 1993. During the
introduction he stated that, "It was disturbing to learn
that the MAUVILLA's operator was attempting to navigate the
tug without the benefit of a marine chart of the area being
transited. But, it was unacceptable to learn that federal
regulations did not require the MAUVILLA's operator to have
a chart of the area navigated." 103
Representative Tauzin implied that applicable
regulations were inadequate. His comments raised important
questions. What government agency would normally prescribe
navigation safety regulations that govern the uninspected
towing industry? Furthermore, did that agency have the
authority to prescribe regulations governing navigation
safety on uninspected towing vessels?
102 Tauzin, Billy, U.S. Representative, "H.R. 3282" statement
accompanying the introduction of The Towing Vessel
Navigation Act of 1993, Congressional Record,
october 14, 1993, para. 2.
103 Tauzin, para. 3.
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CHAPTER 4: LEGISLATION
REGULATORY AUTHORITY FOR INSPECTED & RECREATIONAL VESSELS
The Secretary of Transportation is mandated by law to
prescribe safety regulations for inspected and recreational
vessels. These mandates are illustrated in two sections of
Title 46 united States Code (USC). First, Title 46 USC
Section 3306 applies to vessels subject to inspection. This
law states that, liTo carry out this part and to secure the
safety of individuals and property on board vessels subject
to inspection, the Secretary shall prescribe necessary
regulations to ensure the proper execution of, and to carry
out, this part in the most efficient manner. 11 104 This
appears to be a broad authority to prescribe safety
regulations as may be deemed necessary by the Secretary of
Transportation. Second, Title 46 USC 4302 applies to
recreational vessels. The law says that, liThe secretary may
prescribe regulations establishing minimum safety standards
for recreational vessels and associated equipment, and
establishing procedures and tests required to measure
conformance with those standards, with each
standard .. 11 105 This section includes authority for the
Secretary to require the installation, carrying and use of
associated safety equipment on recreational vessels. 106 The
104 Title 46 United States Code section 3306.
15 Ibid., Section 4302.
106 Ibid.
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authority to prescribe regulations for inspected commercial
and uninspected recreation vessels is broad. However,
neither of the aforementioned sections of law apply to
uninspected towing vessels.
REGULATORY AUTHORITY FOR UNINSPECTED TOWING VESSELS
A close examination and comparison of the applicable
laws clearly show that the Secretary is provided less
authority to prescribe safety equipment regulations for
uninspected commercial towing vessels than inspected
commercial vessels and uninspected recreational vessels.
Title 46 USC Section 4502 enumerates specific safety
equipment and directs the Secretary to prescribe regulations
which require that each vessel to which the chapter applies
be equipped with the listed equipment. ,,107 Effectively, the
Secretary's authority to write regulations is limited to the
requirements imposed by the law, except those regulations
governing operating stability which is determined by
technical expertise.
Additionally, the law governing safety onboard
uninspected vessels except uninspected commercial fishing
industry vessels is found in Title 46 U. S. Code Section
4104. The law simply states that, "The Secretary shall
prescribe regulations to carry out this chapter" .108 The
Secretary is not directed to determine what safety equipment
107 Ibid., section 4502.
108 Ibid., section 4104
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is needed. Nor is the Secretary authorized to prescribe
regulations as may be deemed necessary to improve safety.
Section 4102 contains the specific requirements for safety
equipment. This section specifies that fire extinguishers,
life preservers or other lifesaving equipment, flame
arrestor for carburetors, vents for bilges, and emergency
positioning indicating radio beacons (EPIRBs) shall be
carried. 109 There is no authority for the Secretary to add
to the law. Therefore, the regulations prescribed by the
Secretary simply parrot the law. In effect, Congress has
prescribed the safety regulations which in the words of
Representative Tauzin were "unacceptable". 10
Representative Tauzin also stated that "federal
regulations neglected to require towboats to be equipped
with a compass, a radar, a fathometer, or any other
navigational tools" .11]
Title 33 USC 1223 provides authority to establish
vessel operating requirements in the interest of safety.
The law does not restrict applicability except for fishing
vessels and recreational vessels. ~12 However, the
09 Ibid., Section 4102.
110 Tauzin, para. 3.
11 Ibid.
12 Title 33 United States Code Section 1223.
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navigation safety regulations which currently implement the
law do not apply to self-propelled vessels less than 1,600
gross tons. 1l3
The Ports and waterways Safety Act (33 USC 1223) states
that:
"the Secretary . . . may require vessels to install and
use specified navigation equipment, communications
equipment, electronic relative motion analyzer equipment, or
any electronic or other device . . . which is necessary in
the interests of vessel safety: Provided, That the Secretary
shall not require fishing vessels under 300 gross tons or
recreational vessels of 65 feet or less to possess or use
the equipment or devices required by this subsection solely
under the authority of this Act,,1l4
A limiting factor in the Ports and Waterways Safety Act
is found in Section 1231 which states that "the Secretary
shall issue and may from time to time amend or repeal
regulations necessary to implement"U5 the Act. In the
exercise of this regulatory authority the Secretary "shall
establish procedures in consulting with, and receiving and
considering the views of all interested parties, including:
1) interested Federal departments and agencies;
2) officials of State and local governments;
3) representatives of the maritime community;
4) representatives of port and harbor authorities or
associations;
5) representatives of environmental groups;
6) any other interested parties who are knowledgeable
or experienced in dealing with problems involving
vessel safety, ports and waterways safety, and
protection of the marine environment; and
113 Title 33 Code of Federal Regulations Part 164.
114 Title 33 United States Code Section 1223(a).
115 Ibid., Section 1231
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7) advisory committees consisting of all interested
segments of the public when the establishment of
such committees is considered necessary because the
issue involved are highly complex or
controversial. ,,116
CONTINUING LIMITED AUTHORITY OVER TOWING VESSELS
The trend of limiting navigation safety regulatory
authority over uninspected commercial towing vessels may
continue, despite recent casualties. The Towing Vessel
Navigation Safety act of 1993 would have directed the
Secretary of Transportation to issue regulations prescribing
navigational publication and equipment requirements under
Title 46 USC Section 4102(f). The amendments sought to
require equipping uninspected towing vessels with: "(1)
marine charts of the area being transited; (2) navigational
publications for the area being transited; (3) compasses;
(4) radar; and (5) a fathometer".:17 Once again the
Secretary would not have been provided any discretion,
except to enumerate the size of charts required and the
names of the navigational publications. However, the
authority to expound upon the law in this manner wasn't
exactly clear.
It appears that congressional micro-management of
uninspected commercial towing vessels will continue. This
is not necessarily wrong; however, there may be inherent
problems with the approach. When Representative Tauzin
116 Ibid.
117 H.R. 3282, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, Congressional
Record, October 14, 1993.
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introduced The Towing Vessel Navigational Safety Act of 1993
on October 14, 1993, he stated that, "on October 12, the
subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation held a hearing to
investigate the causes of two towing vessel accidents."L8 He
also stated that," the Amtrak SUNSET derailment was
primarily caused by the human error of an individual towboat
operator. "119 The Amtrak SUNSET derailed on September 22,
1993. Just twenty days later, the one day investigation of
two accidents was conducted by the subcommittee.
Additionally, only one day passed between the day of the
investigation and the day that H.R. 3282 was introduced
proposing legislation to improve safety.
The Towing Vessel Navigation Safety Act of 1993 was
actually drafted before the hearing on October 12, 1993.
Prior to receiving testimony at the hearing, Representative
Tauzin stated that "I am going to initiate the process
toward improving safety of our inland waterways. This
afternoon I will introduce The Towing Vessel Navigation
Safety Act of 1993. The bill was drafted to fill gaping
holes in the regulation of uninspected towing vessels. "120
Perhaps the hearing was just a facade; a superficial
18 Tauzin, paragraph 2
Ibid., para 8.
120 Hearing before the Subcommittee on Coast Gu~rd and
Navigation of the Committee on ~erchant Marlne and .
Fisheries, House of Representat~ves, One Hundred Thlrd
Congress, october 12, 1993, Serlal 103-73, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1994.
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prerequisite used to validate the need for legislation
before Congress. It seems that testimony was solicited to
support Congessional conclusions.
PROMPT LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL?
There is evidence that this legislation was a knee jerk
reaction to the devastating casualty on September 22, 1993.
During the hearing before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard
and Navigation on October 12, 1993, Rear Admiral James C.
Card, Commander of the Eighth Coast Guard District, provided
testimony regarding both the Judge Seeber Bridge allision
and the Amtrak derailment. He stated that the Judge Seeber
Bridge allision occurred after the towboat CHRIS' operator
left the pilot house unattended for five minutes while the
port engine was operating and clutched in the forward
position. Prior to the operator leaving the pilot house,
the CHRIS and the hopper barge DM3021 were intentionally
pushed up (grounded) against the canal bank. Grounding the
barge while waiting for the lock to open is common practice
for towboats. However, the operator pleaded no contest at
an administrative hearing when charged with negligence.
Admiral Card did not speculate as to the cause(s) of the
Amtrak derailment. Furthermore, testimony from George
Reagle, Director, Office of Surface Transportation, National
Transportation Safety Board indicated that both accidents
were under investigation. 121
121 Ibid.
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It is difficult to understand how Representative Tauzin
determined that additional safety equipment would have
prevented these casualties from occurring. At the time of
the hearing, there was no indication that the navigation
safety equipment called for by HR 3282 would have prevented
either of the two aforementioned marine casualties from
occurring.
PREMATURE LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL?
When the legislation was proposed, two separate federal
investigations were ongoing. Admiral Card testified that
the AMTRAK SUNSET LIMITED derailment was currently under
investigation by a National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) Marine Group which included a Coast Guard
investigator to determine the cause of the casualty.
Additionally, a criminal task force, which includes a Coast
Guard representative, was investigating all aspects of the
casualty for possible criminal involvement. Admiral Card
also stated that the Coast Guard was waiting for the results
of both investigations before determining what
administrative or civil penalty actions will be initiated
against any of the involved parties. 122 Yet, a day after
this testimony, a bill was introduced by Representative
Tauzin who declared that, "the subcommittee's investigation
of the Amtrak SUNSET LIMITED tragedy resulted in the prompt
122 Ibid.
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introduction of this bill". 123. The bill was prompt, but
considering that two investigations of the Amtrak derailment
were ongoing at the federal level, the bill may have been
introduced prematurely. There may have been more to learn
from these casualties.
There was no need to rush legislation. In
Representative Tauzin's own words, "I introduced HR 3282 to
require all towing vessels to carry the basic navigational
tools which the vast majority of safe, responsible, towboat
operators already consider as standard equipment". 2~ Must a
prudent mariner be required by law to carry standard
equipment? Representative Tauzin's comments indicated that
proposed legislation did not provide immediate impact on
improving safety; thereby eliminating justification for
prompt legislation. The perplexing reasons for rushing
legislation may be better addressed by a college level
course in Federal Ocean Policy and will not be answered in
this paper.
UNNECESSARY LEGISLATION?
On December 10, 1993 it was reported that the American
Waterway Operators quickly endorsed Representative Tauzin's
proposed legislation to require the carriage of standard
123 Tauzin, paragraph 2, October 14, 1993.
12~ Ibid., para. 4
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equipment. 125 After the grounding of the tank barge MORRIS
J. BERMAN, AWO amended their initial position. In testimony
prepared for presentation before the House Merchant Marine
and Fisheries Committee on March 3, 1994, Thomas A.
Allegretti, president of the American Waterways Operators,
said that due to the "diversity of towing industry
operations . . . a particular navigation aid may add value
in some locations, but have limited utility in others." 126
He further stated that, "Establishing navigation
requirements which apply to all towing vessels, in all
circumstances, can be problematic." _27 In response an
unidentified subcommittee aide was quoted as saying, "We're
open to suggestion to improve the bill, ,,128 "but we're not
interested in watering it down. ,,129
Perhaps AWO anticipated additional Congressional
scrutiny. On March 16, 1994, Representative Gerry Studds
introduced another bill, the Towing Safety Act, to improve
towing vessel safety. During the 103rd Congress,
Representative Studds served as both the Chairman of the
House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries and as
125 Boyd, John, "Barge Accidents a Way of Life on Rivers",
The Journal of Commerce, Vol.398, No. 28,120,
December 10, 1993, Pp. 1A & 4A.
L26 DiBenedetto, William, "Hearings Begin on Barge Safety and
Equipment Use", The Journal of Commerce, Vol. 399, No.
28,175, March 3, 1994, p. 8B.
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid.
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Chairman of the Subcommittee on Environment and Natural
Resources. Representative Studds was quoted as saying he
wants to "bring manning and inspection requirements into the
20th century,,130 Among other focusing events, Representative
Studds cited the 600,000 gallon oil spill off San Juan,
Puerto Rico. The Studds Bill expanded upon the Tauzin Bill.
The Studds Bill addressed vessel inspection, manning
including a requirement for able seaman to possess merchant
mariner documents, in addition to basic navigation equipment
called for by the Tauzin Bill.
After the Studds Bill was introduced, the American
Waterways Operators said that they would fight the measure.
Debra Colbert of the AWO stated that "it was an overreaction
to a serious issue".lJl "The towing barge industry will
continue to push for quick enactment of legislation backed
up by Representative Tauzin. ,,132 She noted that "three
previous attempts to impose inspection and manning
requirements have been unsuccessful. ,,133
130 DiBenedetto, William, "House Leaders to Push for Towing
Standards", The Journal of Commerce, Vol. 399, No.
28,176, March 4, 1994, p. lB.
131 DiBenedetto, William, "Barge Industry Hits House Proposal
for Towboat Safety", The Journal of Commerce, Vol. 399,
No. 28,188, March 22, 1994, p.7B.
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid.
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On September 16, 1994, it was reported that
Representative Studds and Thomas A. Allegretti were
"jockeying for position and looking for common ground". 134
The AWO planned to release its own casualty study, while
Representative Studds was planning to offer an amendment to
the Tauzin bill that he says was supported by Coast Guard
reports. AWO argued that the Coast Guard reports did not
call for legislation in the area of manning, inspection, or
merchant mariner documents.
On September 19, 1994, it was reported that
Representative Studds' staff had dumped the bill and instead
was planning to offer amendments to the Tauzin bill. The
amendments would have required towboat and barge crewmembers
to obtain merchant mariner documents (MMD) similar to those
required of oceangoing seaman. Additionally, the bill
required a vessel inspection program. The MMD requirement
was favored by the Seafarers International Union, but was
opposed by both AWO and Representative Tauzin. It was
predicted that failure to gain full concurrence from
industry and labor could hurt the prospects of getting the
bill out by october 8, 1993 which was the House's
adj.ournment date. Members of the House Merchant Marine and
34 Roberts, William L., "Dispute Heightens Over Barge Safety
As Vote Nears for House Committee", The Journal of
Commerce, Vol. 401, No. 28,312, September 16, 1994.
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Fisheries Committee received letters from Congressman Studds
appealing for their support. It was expected that any
controversy would eventually kill the bill in the Senate. 135
On September 22, 1994, it was reported that barge
safety legislation easily won House Committee approval
despite industry opposition to its manning and inspection
requirements. The House Committee's amended version of the
Tauzin Bill was added to the Coast Guard Authorization Act
as a floor amendment on September 22, 1994 and passed by the
House. 13S Industry lobbyists immediately shifted their
attention to the Senate where they believed they had "a good
chance of winning over a handful of Senators who could hold
up the legislation until industry concerns"13 7 were met.
The Foghorn, a newsletter of the Passenger Vessel
Association, reported that the Senate was opposed to several
provisions of what had become the 250 page document known as
H.R. 4852, the Oceans Act of 1994. On October 8, 1994, the
3~ Roberts, William L., "Barge Industry, House Close Gap On
Safety Plan", The Journal Of Commerce, Vol. 401, No.
28,313, September 19, 1994, p. 12Bi
Roberts, William L., "Lawmaker Seeks to Add Inspection
Rule to Barge Bill", The Journal of Commerce", Vol. 401,
No. 28,314, September 20, 1994, p.1A & 14Ai
Roberts, William L., "Barge Safety Amendment Faces Tight
Vote Today", The Journal of Commerce, Vol. 401, No.
28,315, September 21, 1994, p. 8B.
136 Roberts, William L., "Barge Safety Bill May Pass House As
Part of Coast Guard Budget Plan", The Journal of
Commerce, Volume 401, No. 28,317, September 23, 1994,
p. 8Ai
U.S. Coast Guard Congressional Affairs, Bill Status
Report, Washington, D.C., october 14, 1994.
137 Roberts, william L., "House Leaders Push Vote As Barge
Bill Clears Panel", The Journal of Commerce, Vol. 401,
No. 28,316, September 22, 1992, p. 1A & 2A.
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Senate declined to take up the bill before it recessed. The
Foghorn stated that, "It was not uncommon at the end of a
Congress to package into one bill a number of measures
which, have failed to make it through the legislative
process standing alone. This year was no different. In
addition to the annual reauthorizing of programs for the
Coast Guard, the package included a major regulatory reform
bill which would have given the Coast Guard authority to
accept foreign government approvals of equipment, class
society inspections and certifications, etc., a major
towboat safety bill, recreational boating safety
legislation, the Unsoeld Passenger Vessel Development Act
which would have created incentives to build and operate
large cruise ships in the U. S. and almost 50 other Jones
Act waivers, among other things. "I 8
The power of the American waterway Operators to
influence legislation should not be underestimated. As
planned, Congress was winding down without the passage of
the House legislation. As of October 6, 1994, the Senate
was moving slowly on the barge and towboat safety rules
passed by the House. 1L House members backed off from the
proposed requirements for Merchant Mariner Documents and
were compromising on the terms of a Coast Guard inspection
138 "Major Maritime Bills Crash Hours Before Congress
Recesses", Foghorn, Arlington, VA, November 1994,
Pp. 1 & 10.
139 "Senate Moves Slowly On Barge Safety Rules", The Journal
of Commerce, Vol. 402, No. 28,326, october 6, 1994,
p. lB.
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program. 140 "The House twice passed barge safety legislation
in the closing days of the 103rd Congress, but the
legislation was killed in the Senate by political wrangling
over unrelated maritime issues. After failing to pass
legislation, some in the barge and towing industry now say
new legislation from Congress is not necessary."l41 AWO
"believes that safety can't wait for the next Congress to
consider again this legislation especially since the
additional, controversial provisions make enactment
problematic. ,,142 Furthermore, AWO said that they will
"accelerate its work with the Department of Transportation
and the Coast Guard to implement through the regulatory
process many of the provisions contained in the consensus
legislation. The partnership which exists between industry
and the agency should lead to final rules which obviate the
need for congressional action. ,,143 Proposed regulations will
cover navigation equipment; master, mate and apprentice
licensing; and, a requirement for radar training. 144
140 Roberts, William L., "Lawmakers Act to Save Barge Safety
Legislation", The Journal of Commerce, Vol. 402, No.
28,327, october 7, 1994, p. 8B.
141 Roberts, william L., "Coast Guard, Industry Set Barge
Safety Regulations", The Journal of Commerce, Vol. 402,
No. 28,334, October 19, 1994, p. 1A.
142 Ibid., p. 8A.
143 Ibid.
It,4 Roberts, William L., Proposed Regulations to Cover
Equipment, Licensing and Training", The Journal of
Commerce, Vol. 402, No. 18,334, October 19, 1994, p. 8A.
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A Notice of Proposed Rulemaking amending 33 CFR 164 to
require towing vessels of 8 meters or more in length to
carry specified navigation equipment currently is being
drafted and is expected to be published in June 1995. 145
Unfortunately, unlicensed towing vessel operators may not be
qualified to operate the radars onboard.
On December 2, 1994, the U. S. House of
Representatives' Republican Leadership announced a plan to
eliminate the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee. The
plan was expected to be implemented as part of the House
Rule Package for the 104th Congress. 146 The impact on
impending legislation was yet to be determined; however, it
was a moot point as asserted by the AWO.
A "GOP reform plan eliminated the House Merchant Marine
Fisheries Committee that generated barge safety
legislation."lO On January 4, 1995, the 104th Congress
passed House Resolution 6 which made changes to the
committee system by amending the Rules of the House of
Representatives Section 202 (a). The amendment stated that
"1. There shall be in the House the following committees,
each of which shall have the jurisdiction and related
145 u. S. Coast Guard oil Pollution Act of 1990 Update No. 37,
Commandant (G-MS), washington, D.C., December 15, 1994,
p. 7 & 24.
146 Ibid .
• 4 Roberts, william L, "Barge Bill Off Course", The Journal
of Commerce, Vol. 403, No. 28,387, January 9, 1995,
Supplement to the Journal of Commerce, p. 59.
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functions assigned to it. ,,148 The Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure was assigned the following
responsibilies: Coast Guard, including lifesaving service,
lighthouses, lightships, ocean derelicts, and the Coast
Guard Academy; Inland waterways; Inspection of merchant
marine vessels, lights and signals, lifesaving equipment,
and fire protection on vessels; Navigation and the laws
relating thereto, including pilotage; Registering and
licensing of vessels and smallboats; Rules and international
arrangements to prevent collisions at sea; Measures relating
to merchant marine, except for national security aspects of
merchant marine; Oil and other pollution of navigable
waters, including inland, coastal, and ocean waters; Marine
affairs (including coastal zone management) as they relate
to oil and other pollution of navigable waters;
Transportation, including water transportation and
transportation safety. 149 The Journal of Commerce predicted
that it was "unlikely that new legislation mandating tough
new safety regulations for the barge industry will see the
light of day in the new, Republican-controlled Congress. ,,150
The Journal of Commerce also pointed out that "the
Republican Party, which has been generally anti-regula~ion
and pro-business in its approach to these matters, has
148 House Resolution 6, Resolution Adopting the Rules of the
House of Representatives, Congressional Record dated
Wednesday, January 4, 1995
149 Ibid., Section 202(a)1(q) as amended
150 Roberts, January 9, 1995, p. 59.
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gained both control of the House and the Senate."15 In
addition, both the barge industry and the Coast Guard have
been moving forward with new precautions to address the main
safety issues raised." 52 AWO can now boast that four
attempts to impose inspection and manning requirements have
been unsuccessful.
151 Ibid., p. 59.
52 Ibid., p. 59.
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CHAPTER 5: PERSONHEL INVESTIGATIONS AND SUBSEQUENT ACTION
AWO's opposition to an inspection program has been
documented. There has been a great deal of study and
discussion concerning: navigation safety equipment; vessel
inspection and boarding programs; manning; licensing; crew
training; and, casualty reporting. Throughout these
studies, the conclusions point out that human factors serve
to cause most marine casualties and that an inspection
program is not needed. 153 The studies have not reviewed
personnel investigations as a means of prevention through
enforcement as referenced in the Coast Guard's Business Plan
for Marine Safety and Environmental Protection. Personnel
investigations are a proper and effective means to address
many marine casualties caused by human factors.
INITIATING PERSONHEL INVESTIGATIONS
As previously noted, investigation of marine casualties
and the determinations made are for the purpose of taking
appropriate measures for promoting safety of life and
153 Evaluation of Casualty Incidents for the U. S. Towing
Industry 1981 - 1990, p. II -3, III -7, III -14, III -15,
Appendix B;
u.S. Coast Guard Commandant's Action on the
Review of Marine Safety, Issues Related to Uninspected
Towing Vessels, Washington, D.C., December 6, 1993;
Towing Vessel Inspection Study, Prepared by U.S. Coast
Guard Merchant Vessel Inspection and Documentation
Division, Paragraphs II.C, III.b.(2), VII.a,
Pp. 2, 3, 4,10;
An Assessment of Towing Vessel Manning Requirements,
Prepared by U.S. Coast Guard, Offi~e of Marine Safety,
Security and Environmental Protectlon, July 1994;
Towing Safety Advisory Committee Task Force on Entry
Level Training, Washington, D.C., February 7, 1994.
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property at sea. They are not intended to fix civil or
criminal responsibility. However, the investigation may
determine as closely as possible:
"Whether there is evidence that any act of
misconduct, inattention to duty, negligence or
willful violation of the law on the part of any
licensed or certificated man contributed to the
casualty, so that appropriate proceedings against
the license or certificate of such person may be
recommended and taken." 154
Additionally, Title 46 CFR Section 5.101(a) states that
personnel:
"Investigations may be initiated in any case in
which it appears that there are reasonable grounds
to believe that the holder of a license,
certificate or document issued by the Coast Guard
may have:
(1) Committed an act of incompetency, misconduct,
or negligence while acting under the authority of a
license, certificate or document;
(2) Violated or failed to comply with subtitle II
of title 46, U.S.C., a regulation prescribed under
this subtitle, or any other law or regulations
intended to promote marine safety or to protect the
navigable waters, while acting under the authority
of a license, certificate or document;
(3) Been convicted of a dangerous drug law
violation, or has been a user of, or addicted to
the use of, a dangerous drug, so as to be subject
to the provisions of 46 U. S. C. 7704. ,,155
Title 46 CFR Section 5.105 states that:
"During an investigation, the investigating officer
may take appropriate action as follows:
(a) Profer charges.
(b) Accept voluntary,,156 permanent "surrender of a
license, certificate or document.
(c) Accept voluntary,,157 temporary "deposit of a
license, certificate or document.
154 Title 46 Code of Federal RegUlations Part 4.
155 Title 46 Code of Federal RegUlations Part 5.
156 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
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(d) Refer the case to others for further action ,,158
"(e) Give a written warning. ,,159 "Refusal to accept
the written warning will normally result in a
withdrawal of the warning and the referral of
charges. An unrejected warnin~ will become a
part of the person's record. ,,16
"(f) Close the case,,161 without further action.
INITIATING PERSONNEL ACTION
When an investigating officer profers charges, action
is taken to suspend or revoke licenses, documents and
merchant mariner documents issued by the U. S. Government.
It seems reasonable to believe that the list of appropriate
actions will be amended to include a limited, temporary
suspension authority as authorized by the oil Pollution Act
of 1990. Temporary Suspension Authority is discussed in
greater detail later.
Title 46 United States Code Section 7701 states that,
"the purpose of suspension and revocation proceedings is to
promote safety at sea. ,,162 Section 7703 states that a
license, certificate of registry, or merchant mariner's
document may be
"suspended or revoked if, when acting under the
authority of that license certificate, or document, the
holder:
1) has violated or failed to comply Title 46 united
States Code, a regulation prescribed under Title 46
or any other law or regulation intended to promote
marine safety or to protect navigable waters.
158 Ibid.
159 Ibid.
160 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
162 Title 46 United States Code Section 7701(a)
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2) has committed an act of incompetence, misconduct or
negligence. ,,163
Additionally, Section 7704 states that if it is shown
at a hearing that a holder of a license, certificate of
registry, or merchant mariner's document:
"1) has been convicted of violating a dangerous drug
law of the U. S. or of a state, the license,
certificate or document shall be revoked.
2) if the holder has been a user of, or addicted to, a
dangerous drug, the license, certificate of
registry or merchant mariner's document shall be
revoked, unless there is satisfactory proof of
cure. ,,16~
Personnel investigations which evolve after a casualty
and subsequent personnel actions are tracked in MSIS. The
data can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of the Coast
Guard's personnel investigation program following casualties
where a presumption of negligence exist.
RECENT PERSONNEL ACTION STATISTICS (1992-1993)
Earlier it was mentioned that the Marine Safety
Information System (MSIS) can be used to compile and extract
history of marine casualties. MSIS can also be used to
extract data to determine both the number of personnel
investigations initiated and suspension and revocation (S&R)
cases, resulting therefrom. S&R proceedings may involve
both holders of merchant mariner documents (MMD), as well
as, licensed personnel.
163 Ibid., Section 7703
164 Ibid., Section 7704 as amended by the oil Pollution Act
of 1990, Public Law 101-380, Section 4103, August 18,
1990.
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Currently, MSIS methodology does not separate merchant
mariner cases from U. S. license cases. Therefore, the
total number of S&R cases includes both categories.
However, personnel action cases which stem from a towing
vessel grounding can be assumed to involve licensed
personnel, only. The nature of the casualty would not
involve a person who holds an MMD.
Approximately 4% of the personnel investigations
initiated in 1992 and 1993 resulted from vessel
groundings .165 During the two year period, 3,500 personnel
investigations involving U. S. licensed personnel and MMD
holders were initiated. 166 Personnel action was initiated in
2,897 cases. Only 152 personnel investigations were
initiated following 1,583 U. S. vessel groundings caused by
human factors. 167 This equates to only 10% of the vessel
groundings. The 152 personnel investigations resulted in
follow-up action taken against 138 licensed personnel. ;68
This means that when a personnel investigation was initiated
after a grounding, remedial action against a licensed person
occurred 91% of the time. However, it is important to
remember that personnel investigations were initiated
following only 10% of the groundings.
165 U. S. Coast Guard Commandant (G-MMI-3) letter 16732 to
LCDR Paul Cormier, December 5, 1994.
166 Ibid.
167 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
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It seems odd that 1,977 groundings involving U. s.
vessels occurred over two years and that 1,583 of these
groundings were caused by human factors, but only 152
resulted in personnel investigations. One might argue that
the 1,583 groundings included fishing vessels manned by
unlicensed personnel; therefore, personnel action against a
license was not an available option. Unfortunately that
argument does not suffice because there were 763 groundings
in the United States that involved towing vessels of which
600 were caused by human factors; nearly four times the 152
total personnel investigations. 169 Furthermore it is
unlikely that all 152 personnel investigations stemmed from
towing vessel casualties. It is possible that some of the
towing vessel groundings involved persons who were exempted
from licensing requirements. If so, this would establish an
argument to require all towing vessel operators to be
licensed, without exception.
The lack of personnel investigations initiated makes
less sense in light of a presumption of negligence that
exist when a grounding occurs. Presumption of negligence
will be discussed later.
The reasoning for the lack of investigations is not
clear but there is room for speculation. Perhaps there is
extreme difficulty in pursuing personnel action due to
difficulty in obtaining evidence. Due to the nature of
169 Ibid.
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towboat manning, only one person (operator) is required in
the wheel house; hence, there may be no eye-witnesses to the
casualty.
Perhaps the rapid turnover of casualty investigators
lends itself to overall inexperience and inefficiency. The
Coast Guard Marine Safety Officer Training Database for 1993
provides a snapshot of individual assignment histories. The
database indicates that 582 officers out of 1,244 records on
file had experience as an investigating officer at some
point in their career. J70 Together the 1,244 officers
possessed 8,396 years of cumulative Marine Safety experience
in six specialties: marine inspections; licensing; marine
environmental protection; readiness planning; and,
investigations .171 This is an average of 6.8 years of marine
safety experience per individual. Although investigations
is one of six specialties listed, only 819 years or about
10% of the 8,390 years of marine safety experience was
served as an investigating officer. 172 The average time
spent as an investigating officer was less than 1 year and 5
months per individual. 17
70 U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Officer Training and On-
the-Job Training Database for 1993, available from
Commandant (G-MP-3), Office of Marine Safety, Security
and Environmental Protection, Washington, D.C., 1993
111 Ibid.
172 Ibid.
173 Ibid.
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Besides a lack of investigative experience, perhaps a
low number of inexperienced casualty investigators assigned
to investigate a disproportionate number of casualties lends
itself to work overload. This may result in conducting more
investigations from an armchair behind a desk, than onscene.
Although 582 individuals had marine safety investigative
experience, only about 115 persons were billeted to perform
casualty and personnel investigations at field offices
throughout the united States. 174 These figures were obtained
from the Coast Guard's Commissioned and Warrant Officer
Billet Manual which furnishes a listing of authorized
billets. The listing was completely valid only on August
23, 1994 when it was compiled. Billet changes occur
regularly through additions, deletions, relocations,
upgrading, downgrading, and other personnel allowance
actions. 7S These figures can be used to compare personnel
resources which were available to investigate the 17,869
vessel casualties in addition to investigating personnel
involvement and carrying out personnel action when needed in
1992 and 1993. On average, each investigating officer
conducted 77 vessel casualties per year or about 1.5 per
week. This is in addition to approximately 15 personnel
174 U.S. Coast Guard, Commissioned and Warrant Officer
Billet Manual, COMDINST M5320.70, washington, D.C.,
September 12, 1994, Enclosure 1 and 3.
175 Ibid., p. 4-1.
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investigations per year or about .2 per week; plus any
sUbsequent personnel action cases and other than vessel
casualty investigations which are initiated.
Perhaps there are not enough government vehicles or
vessels available to respond to groundings onscene in remote
locations. Perhaps insufficient continuous funding needed
to operate government cars or reimburse investigators for
the use of personally owned vehicles is also a factor.
Perhaps groundings that are touch and go, make it difficult
for investigating officers to catch up with involved parties
making it a necessity to conduct an armchair investigation.
Then again, taking action against licensed personnel
can be an arduous task which requires preparation for a
hearing and presentation of evidence before an
administrative law jUdge. This task may prove to be
overwhelming for inexperienced investigators who are
simultaneously tasked to conduct casualty investigations.
The excuses are pure speculation and not supported "by
numbers. They are offered to show that further research is
needed to draw a reasonable and factual conclusion as to why
so few personnel investigations are initiated following
grounding of towing vessels where a human factor is known to
be the cause 79% of the time. Perhaps conducting personnel
investigations less than 25% of the time where a presumption
of negligence exist is an acceptable practice. A mission
performance standard should be established to provide
adequate enforcement through personnel action to address the
human element.
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ADMONISHMENT, SUSPENSION OR REVOCATION PROCEEDINGS
Some personnel investigations result in personnel
action that involve a hearing before an administrative law
jUdge. Title 5 United States Code Sections 551-559 apply to
adjudication proceedings. Title 46 united States Code
Chapter 77 authorizes suspending or revoking a license,
certificate of registry, or merchant mariner's document in
accordance with Title 5 united States Code Section 551 -
559.
It is important to emphasize an administrative hearing
is held to pursue action against a License, Certificate of
Registry, or Merchant Mariner's Document. It is not an
action against the holder or person. Therefore, the outcome
of a hearing is decided upon by the preponderance of
evidence presented as opposed to proof beyond a reasonable
doubt needed to decide the outcome of alleged criminal
activity.
Title 46 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 5
implements 46 USC Chapter 77. 46 CFR 5.1(a) states that
"the Administrative Procedure Act, Title 5 U.S.C. Section
551, et seq, requires that hearings held in conjunction with
these administrative actions are to be presided over by an
Administrative Law Judge.'"
176 Title 46 Code of Federal Regulations Section 5.1(a).
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The Commandant of the Coast Guard has delegated "the
authority to admonish, suspend with or without probation or
revoke a license, certificate or document issued to a person
by the Coast Guard under any navigation or shipping law,,177
to Administrative Law Judges.
The reasons for "administrative action against a
license are remedial and not penal in nature."U8 The
"actions are intended to help maintain standards for
competence and conduct essential to the promotion of safety
at sea. " l79 Such authority would provide immediate remedial
action following marine casualties where no personnel
investigation and action is currently taken.
The general flow of functions are as follows:
"In proceedings involving the suspension or
revocation of a Coast Guard license, certificate or
document issued to an individual, the course and method
by which such proceedings are channeled are as follows:
(1) In the united states, the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, Territory of Guam, the virgin Islands,
and other possessions, the proceedings are
initiated by the proferment of charges and
specifications against the holder of the Coast
Guard license, certificate or document. A Coast
Guard Investigating Officer under the supervision
of an Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection, or an
Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection causes the
charges and specifications to be served on the
person described therein (person charged) who is a
holder of a Coast Guard license, certificate or
document. At a hearing the Coast Guard submits
evidence to support the charges and specifications,
while the person charged may submit evidence in
177 Ibid., Section 5. 19 ( a) .
11 Ibid., Section 5.5.
179 Ibid.
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rebuttal or mitigation. The Administrative Law
Judge renders a decision on the basis of the
evidence adduced at the hearing and the law. The
Administrative Law Judge's decision is given to the
person charged.
(2) In a case where an appeal is made by the person
charged, the notice of appeal is filed with the
Administrative Law Judge who heard the case or with
any Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection, for
forwarding to such Administrative Law Judge. 11 180
Hearings are presided over and are conducted under the
exclusive control of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).
The ALJ "shall regulate and conduct the hearing in such a
manner so as to bring out all of the relevant and material
facts, and to insure a fair and important hearing. 11 181 The
detailed hearing procedures can be found in Title 46 Code of
Federal Regulations sections 5.501 through 5.607.
liThe procedures below are usually followed:
(1) Administrative Law Judge's opening statement.
(2) Appearances of persons at the hearing.
(3) Verification of currently valid license,
certificate and/or document held by respondent.
(4) The Administrative Law Judge advises the
respondent of his or her rights.
(5) Exclusion of witnesses from the hearing room.
(6) Preliminary motions, objections and/or
corrections to the charges and specifications.
(7) A reading of the charges with respondent's
answer.
(8) opening statement of investigating officer.
(9) opening statement by or on behalf of the
respondent or statements in mitigation if the
respondent has admitted to the charge and
specification or has answered no contest.
(10) Submission of evidence.
(11) Argument by the investigating officer and
argument by or on behalf of the respondent.
(12) The investigating officer and respondent are
given the opportunity to submit proposed findings
and conclusions.
18 Ibid., Section 1.01-25(c).
181 Ibid., Section 5.501(a).
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(13) The Administrative Law Judge renders findings
and conclusions.
(14) Submission of prior record of the respondent
and evidence in aggravation or mitigation.
(15) The Administrative Law Judge renders an order.
(16) The Administrative Law Judge serves complete
written decision.
(17) The Administrative Law Judge advises the
respondent of the right to appeal.
(18) The Administrative Law Judge declares that the
hearing is closed. ,,182
It is important to note that, during the submission of
evidence, admissions made by a person during a casualty
investigation under 46 CFR Parts 4 and 5 may not be used
against that person in a suspension and revocation
proceeding. This rule exists to promote full disclosure and
to facilitate determinations as to the cause of marine
casualties. This is clearly stated in Title 46 CFR Section
5.103(b) .183 Since only one person is required to be in the
vessel's wheel house, there may be no witnesses when an
allision or grounding occurs except for the person
responsible for the casualty. In UNITED STATES v. SORIANO,
the trial court failed to establish the location of the
casualty due to insufficient evidence. On appeal, jUdgement
for respondent ruled that a presumption of negligence does
not arise until the libellant "produces evidence which
should lead the court to find that the casualty occurred at
a place which should give rise to the presumption. ,,184
182 • dIbid., Sectlon 5.501( ).
183 Ibid., Section 5.103(b).
184 UNITED STATES v. SORIANO, 366 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1966)
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When the location of the grounding can be established,
the "presumption of negligence" is an important rule that
can be applied when charges are proferred against an
operator of uninspected towing vessels following an allision
or grounding where there may not be any witnesses to the
casualty, but the vessel is observed to be aground after the
fact.
PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE - ALLISIONS AND GROUNDINGS
It has long been established that a presumption of
negligence may exist in the case of groundings and
allisions. A presumption of negligence is a concept which
is also applied within admiralty jurisdiction of the federal
courts. The concept of fault presupposes a standard of
care. In collision cases, the standard of care is provided
by specific statutory provisions and other concepts such as
custom, reasonable care and good seamanship. "The rule
creating a presumption of fault against a vessel that
violates a statutory rule or a regulation having the force
of statute is universally known as the Pennsylvania Rule. ,,185
"The strictness of the application of these statutory
standards is magnified by the Supreme Court's decision that
violation of a statutory standard of care, establishing that
vessel's fault, also shifts the burden on the proximate
cause issue to the one violating the statutory rule to prove
18'> Healy, Nicholas J. and Da";id. J. Sharpe, "Admiralty Case
and Materials", West Publ1.sh1.ng Company, St. Paul,
Minnesota, 2nd ed., 1986, p. 603
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that the violation could not have been one of the causes of
the accident. ,,186 "It is a matter of law, no longer in
dispute, that when a moving vessel strikes a stationary
object, a presumption of negligence arises, and a heavy
burden is placed on the operator of a vessel if he is to
rebut the presumption. ,,181
An allision is a strong indicator that negligence may
have contributed to the cause of an accident. "No general
standard of conduct need be addressed in the event of an
allision in order to establish a rebuttable presumption of
negligence. ,,188 " Implicit in the presumption is the standard
of care to which an operator is held, i.e., prudently
navigated vessels do not allide with fixed, charted
structures. ,,189
186 The Steamship Pennsylvania v. Troop, 86 U.S. 125, (1873);
Arabian Oil Co. v. Hellenic Lines, LTD, 633 F. Supp. 659
(S.D.N.Y. 1986)
187 united States of America U. S. Coast Guard v. License No.
005802 (Oldow), Decision of the Vice Commandant on Appeal
No. 2373, October 16, 1984, p. 6;
The OREGON, 158 U.S. 186, 193 (1984);
The CLARITA and the CLARA, 23 Wall 1, 13 (1874);
BROWN and ROOT MARINE OPERATORS v. ZAPATA OFFSHORE CO.,
377 F.2d 724 (CA. 5, 1967)
188 United States of America, U. S. Coast Guard v. License No.
26468 and Merchant Mariners Document No. 438-78-4714
(Goyneaux), Decision of the Vice Commandant on Appeal No.
2288, February 24, 1983, p. 16.
189 Ibid.
77
A grounding is also an indicator that negligence may
have contributed to the cause of an accident. 190 "The
rationale for the presumption is elementary. Ships under
careful navigation do not run aground or strike fixed
objects in the ordinary course of events." 91
In U.S. Coast Guard v. License No. 499864 Issued to
David Rabren, it was found that the appellant was guilty of
negligence in that he wrongfully grounded the SS GULF TIGER
in Tampa Bay, Florida, while serving as pilot under the
authority of License No. 499864 on or about August 13, 1978.
On appeal, the order of the Administrative Law Judge was
vacated and the charges dismissed. However, the opinion of
the U.S. Coast Guard Vice Commandant strongly supported the
notion of rebuttable presumption of negligence.
Rebuttal evidence may be introduced which supports the
conclusion that an appellant acted prudently under the
circumstances. Unless the conditions were such that they
"could not have been foreseen by the exercise of the kind of
judgement which good seamanship requires, the burden of
disproving negligence has not been met. ,,192 When substantial
190 SANDERS v. MYERSTEIN, 124 F.Supp. 77, (D.C. E.D. N.C.
1954)
191 united States of America, U.S. Coast Guard v. License No.
005802 (Oldow), p. 7.
192 PATTERSON OIL TERMINALS v. The PORT OF COVINGTON, 109 F.
Supp. 953,955 (E. D. Pa 1952), aff'd 208 F.2d 694 (3rd
Cir 1953)
78
evidence is adduced showing the lack of fault of the party
charged, presumption alone is no longer sufficient to prove
a case of negligence. 193
A presumption does not disappear merely because
contrary evidence is offered. "Rebuttal merely returns to
the Investigating Officer the burden of going forward with
the case." 194 Inexperienced Investigating Officers may not
always have the ability to move the case forward.
In the case of RABREN, the investigating officer failed
to go forward with the case after a presumption was
rebutted. The Vice Commandant's opinion stated that,
"Unfortunately, the Investigating Officer, perhaps infected
with the confusion permeating the proceeding, failed
adequately to elaborate the conditions of the speed,
momentum and constriction of maneuvering area which may well
have rendered Appellant's 'sheer' defense meaningless with
regard to the ultimate grounding. "195 The burden of
establishing substantial evidence of a reliable and
probative character of the elements of the offense charged
was not successfully met by the Coast Guard. Perhaps the
ALJ whose decision was overturned on appeal was equally
confused or sympathetic to the Investigator's cause.
193 BISSO v. INLAND WATERWAYS CORP, 114 F.Supp. 713 (E.D.La.
1959)
194 United States of
499864 (Rabren) ,
Appeal No. 2235,
195 Ibid.
America, U.S. Coast Guard v. License No.
Decision of the Vice Commandant on
February 9, 1981, p. 9.
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Lessons learned in the RABREN case prove that a
presumption of negligence is rebuttable. This shifts the
onus to the Investigating Officer. Without testimony of
witnesses or the individual charged, and without the ability
to use admissions previously made by a person during an
investigation, the Investigating Officer may be forced to
drop charges. Knowing this in advance may deter the
Investigating Officer from initiating proper investigations.
The odds seem to be stacked in favor of Operators of
Uninspected Towing Vessels and against the investigating
officer.
ultimately, this may result in a lower number of
proferred actions or no action against an operator of
uninspected towing vessels when action should be pursued. A
lesser action may be the issuance of a written warning by
the Investigating Officer. However, the operator may refuse
to accept the written warning, leaving the Investigating
Officer with two options. First, the Investigator may
withdraw the warning and profer charges in a case where
confidence in presenting evidence is lacking. The
alternative is to close the case without action even though
a presumption of negligence existed.
If an Investigating Officer profers charges and
presents what appears to be substantial evidence of a
reliable and probative nature, the Administrative Law
Judge's decision may be overturned on appeal as in the case
of RABREN. Appeals will be discussed in chapter 6 ..
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CHAPTER 6: APPEAL PROCESS
APPEALS TO COMMANDANT
RABREN demonstrates that even if the Investigating
Officer succeeds in proving a case, the respondent may find
cause to appeal the Administrative Law Judge's decision.
The detailed procedures for appeal are found in Title 46
Code of Federal Regulations Part 5, Subpart J:
"A Respondent against whom a finding of proved has been
rendered may appeal such decision to the Commandant."l96
"The hearing transcript, together with all papers and
exhibits filed, shall constitute the record for
decision on appeal. The only matters which will be
considered by the Commandant on the appeal are:
(1) Rulings on motions or objections which were not
waived during the proceedings;
(2) Clear errors on the record;
( 3) Jurisdictional questions." 197
"The Commandant may affirm, reverse, alter, or modify
the decision of the Administrative Law Judge, or may
remand the case for further proceedings. The Decision
of the Commandant on Appeal is the final agency action
in the absence 0 f a remand." 198
Both the Commandant and the Administrative Law Judge
take official notice of previous Commandant's decision on
appeals. Judicial notice is known as "the recognition of
facts by a court as true without proof of evidence, because
196 Title 46 Code of Federal Regulations Section 5.701(b)
197 Ibid.
198 Ibid., Section 5.705 (a) .
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they are well known, easily ascertainable, or so related to
the official character of the court that it is sensible to
recognize them. ,,199
"In addition to other rules providing for jUdicial
notice, the Commandant and the Administrative Law Judges
will consider, ,,20e Commandant's decisions in all appeal and
review cases "without requiring the investigating officer or
the respondent to submit them in evidence". 201
"These Decisions are issued seriatim and are public
records. ,,202 Commandant decisions on appeal may also be
appealed to another level.
SUBSEQUENT APPEALS TO NTSB
The Commandant's Decision on Appeal may be appealed to
the National Transportation Safety Board. "The rules of
procedure for appeals to the National Transportation Safety
Board from decisions of the Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard,
affirming orders of suspension or revocation of licenses,
certificates, or documents are in 49 CFR part 825. These
rules give the party adversely affected by the Commandant or
his attorney of the decision to file a notice of appeal with
the Board. ,,203
The only issues that may be considered on appeal by
NTSB are:
"(a) A finding of a material fact is erroneous;
(b) A necessary legal conclusion is without
governing precedent or is a departure from or
contrary to law or precedent;
199 U. S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Manual Volume V, Chapter
l.G.3.C.
200 Title 46 Code of Federal Regulations Section 5.541(a)
201 Ibid., Section 5.541(a)(4).
202 Ibid., Section 5.711 (a) .
203 Ibid., Section 5.713 (a) .
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(c) A substantial and important question of law,
policy, or discretion is involved; or
(d) A prejudicial procedural error has occurred. "Z04
"On review by the Board, if no reversible error is
found in the Commandant's decision on appeal, that
decision will be affirmed. "Z05
"On review by the Board, if reversible error is
found in the Commandant's decision on appeal, the
Board may:
(1) Set aside the entire decision and dismiss the
charges if it finds the error incurable; or
(2) Set aside the order, or conclusions, or
findings of the Commandant and remand the case to
him for further consideration if it finds the error
curable. ,,206
When a matter has been remanded to the Commandant,
"the Commandant may act in accordance with the terms of
the order of remand, or he may, as appropriate, further
remand the matter to the administrative law jUdge of
the Coast Guard who heard the case, or to another
administrative law judge of the Coast Guard, with
appropriate directions. "Z07
When a Commandant's decision on appeal is affirmed by
the Board, the appellant "may seek further relief from an
adverse decision in federal court. "Z08
If the Board sets aside the entire decision and
dismisses the charge or sets aside the order, conclusion or
findings of the Commandant, the respondent may seek an award
of attorney fees and other expenses under the Equal Access
to Justice Act.
204 Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations Section 825.15.
Z05 Ibid., Section 825.30.
206 Ibid.
207 Ibid.
208 united States Coast Guard Marine Safety Manual, volume V,
Chapter 2.H.3.
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ADVERSARY ADJUDICATION
The Equal Access to Justice Act states that "an agency
that conducts an adversary adjudication shall award, to a
prevailing party other than the United States, fees and
other expenses incurred by that party in connection with
that proceeding, unless the adjudicative officer of the
agency finds that the position of the agency was
sUbstantially justified or that special circumstances make
an award unjust. ,,209
Adversary adjudication means an adjudication under
Title 5 Section 554 "in which the position of the United
States is represented by counselor otherwise, but excludes
an adjudication for the purpose of establishing or fixing a
rate or for the purpose of granting or renewing a
license. ,,210 While proceedings to grant or renew licenses
are excluded, "proceedings to modify, suspend, or revoke
licenses are covered.,,211 This includes Coast Guard
suspension or revocation of licenses, certificates or
documents. 212 "Coverage of the Act begins at designation of
a proceeding or issuance of a charge sheet,,21 by an
investigator.
209 Title 5 United States Code Section 504 (a) ( 1) .
210 Ibid., Section 504(b)(1)(C).
211 Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations Section 6.5 (a)
212 Ibid.
213 Ibid.
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The implementation of the Equal Access to Justice Act
in Agency Proceedings for the Department of Transportation
is found in Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations Part 6.
"The Act applies to adversary adjudications conducted by the
Department of Transportation ,,214 in which "the Department's
position is represented by an attorney or other
representative who enters an appearance and participates in
the proceeding. ,,215 The Secretary of Transportation
delegated the authority to take final action, other than
rulemaking, on matters pertaining to the Equal Access to
Justice Act to the head of each operating administration
within the Department of Transportation. Additionally, the
head of each operating administration may redelegate the
authority. 216
"Judicial review of final agency decision on awards may
be sought as provided in 5 U.S.C. 504(e)(2).,,217 Title 5
United States Code Section 504(c)(2) states that if a party
"is dissatisfied with a determination of fees and other
expenses made, ,,218 that party may "appeal the determination
to the court of the United States having jurisdiction. ,,219
214 Ibid.
215 Ibid.
216 Title 46 Code of Federal Regulations Section 6.13.
217 Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations Section 6.37.
218 Title 5 United States Code Section 504(c) (2).
219 Ibid.
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To avoid adversary adjudication, Coast Guard
Investigating Officers must ensure that profering charges
against an individual is sUbstantially justified. The value
of ensuring that substantial justification exist prior to
designating a proceeding was evident in BRUCH v U.S. COAST
GUARD.
BRUCH v. U.S. COAST GUARD, 749 F. SUPP. 688, (1990 E.D. PA)
"Administrative Law Judge did not abuse his discretion
in determining that dockmasters who had been cited by
Coast Guard for allegedly docking boats without
requisite license were not entitled to recovery of
costs and fees under Equal Access to Justice Act, 5
USCS Sec. 504, where Coast Guard was 'substantially
justified' under 5 USCS Sec. 504(a)(1) in issuing
citations even though Coast Guard had not formulated
nationwide policy governing licensing of dockmasters,
because (1) Administrative Law Judge had decided two
cases establishing clear legal foundation for issuing
citations, and (2) local officials were justified in
enforcing consistent interpretation of governing law in
region. ,,220
Requiring surveyor reports following a towing vessel
casualty would provide substantial justification to issue a
charge sheet when a mechanical failure is found to be non-
existing after a casualty is reportedly caused by mechanical
failure. This concept will be addressed in chapter 7.
220 BRUCH v. U.S. Coast Guard, 749 F. Supp. 688,
(1990 E.D. Pa);
United States Code Service Cumulative supplement, "5 USCS
Section 504 Interpretive Notes and Decision~, 14 -
Particular Circumstances," Lawyers Cooperatlve
Publishing, New York, May, 1994, p. 8.
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CHAPTER 7: ADDRESSING SAFETY AND LACK OF EVIDENCE
OTHER PRESUMPTIONS REGARDING LOGBOOKS
In federal court, "several presumptions relate to log
books, inclUding the presumption that a log book contains
adverse information if there is an unexplained failure to
produce it on request of the attorney for the other
party. 11 221 When a detailed account of a collision is
contained in a logbook which fails to "mention a serious
fault subsequently charged against another vessel, the court
may draw an inference that the fault was not in fact
committed." 222 Unexplained erasures in a logbook create an
inference that the words erased would be unfavorable to the
vessel. "When a mistake is made, a line should be drawn
through the words in such a way as to leave them legible." 223
Title 46 united States Code Chapter 113 contains the
requirements for official logbooks. Section 11301(a) states
that; "except a vessel on a voyage from a port in the united
States to a port in Canada, a vessel of the united States
shall have an official logbook if the vessel is-
221 Healy, p. 633
222 Healy, p. 603.
223 Healy, p. 603.
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(1) on a voyage from a port in the United States on the
Atlantic Ocean and on the Pacific Ocean. ,,224
Section 11301 (b)(12) states that "the master of the
vessel shall make or have made in the official logbook the
following entries: "225 • "when a marine casualty occurs,
a statement about the casualty and the circumstances under
which it occurred, made immediately after the casualty when
practicable to do so. ,,226
Towing vessels on domestic voyages are not required to
maintain an official logbook. If a logbook is used, it may
be admitted as evidence in an administrative hearing. It is
plausible that an Investigating Officer could attempt to
assert the aforementioned presumptions. Title 46 Code of
Federal Regulations Section 5.545(b) states that, "an entry
in any logbook kept on a vessel may be admitted into
evidence ,,22 7 at an administrative hearing, "as an exception
to the hearsay rule under the Federal Rules of Evidence as a
record of regularly conducted activity. ,,228 The point is
that an investigating officer cannot anticipate that a
logbook containing detailed accounts of a towing vessel
casualty will be available as evidence in an administrative
hearing.
224 Title 46 United States Code Section 11301(a)
225 Ibid, Section 11301(b)(12)
226 Ibid.
227 Title 46 Code of Federal Regulations Section 5.545(b)
228 Ibid.
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Not only is there a lack of evidence when logbooks are
not required; there is also a prohibition from using
admissions made during investigation interviews. As
previously pointed out, Title 46 Code of Federal Regulations
Section 5.551 states that "No person shall be permitted to
testify with respect to admissions made by the respondent
during or in the course of an investigation under this part
or part 4 of this title except for the purpose of
impeachment. ,,229 Fortunately, a presumption of negligence
shifts the burden to the respondent when a grounding or
allision occurs because otherwise there is very little
evidence available when a casualty involving a towing
vessel. A surveyor's report following a towing vessel
grounding would provide additional evidence at an
administrative proceeding while also increasing post
casualty navigation safety.
SURVEYOR'S REPORT TO ASSURE SAFETY AND ESTABLISH EVIDENCE
The Coast Guard's Assessment of Towing vessel Manning
requirements pointed out that "certain causes within the
CASMAIN database are considered as personnel related when
they represent specific mechanically related issues. ,,230
Some of the personnel causes cited were "equipment, design
229 Ibid., Section 5.551
dO "An Assessment of Towing Vessel Manning Requirements",
united States Coast Guard Office of Marine Safety,
Security and Environmental Protection, July 1994, p. 7.
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criteria exceeded, and improper maintenance. ,,231 The Towing
Vessel Safety Act's legislative history makes it clear that
a towing vessel inspection program is opposed by industry;
therefore, it is unlikely that such an inspection program
will be established.
When a grounding or allision occurs, it is possible
that the cause could be mechanically related and does not
include human factors. Mechanical failure also offers a
convenient excuse for licensed operators. If towing vessels
were inspected, alterations and repairs that involve safety
would be SUbject to inspection by a Coast Guard marine
inspector who could confirm or deny that mechanical factors
were involved.
Title 46 Code of Federal Regulations Section 2.01-15(a)
that no repair or alterations affecting the safety of an
inspected vessel or machinery shall be made without Coast
Guard approval. Section 2.01-15(b) states that "if repairs
to an inspected vessel are necessary, such a vessel may be
permitted to proceed to another port for repairs if in the
opinion of the marine inspector it can be done with
safety. ,,232
Towing vessels are not inspected; therefore, they are
not currently subject to post casualty inspection.
Nevertheless, current regulation does provide the Coast
Guard Captain of the Port with the ability to ascertain the
23" Ibid.
232 Title 46 Code of Federal Regulations Section 2.01-15(b)
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results of post casualty surveys and repairs. Furthermore,
provisions exist which require immediate notice of hazardous
conditions.
Earlier it was pointed out that notice and a written
report of a casualty must be provided to the Coast Guard.
Another regulation requires towing vessels to provide
immediate notice of a grounding to the Coast Guard. Title
33 Code of Federal Regulations Section 160.215 states that
"whenever there is a hazardous condition on board a vessel,
the owner, master, agent or person in charge shall
immediately notify the Captain of the Port of destination
and Captain of the Port of the port or place in which the
vessel is located of the hazardous condition. "233 Section
160.203 defines a hazardous condition as "any condition that
could adversely affect the safety of any vessel, bridge,
structure, or shore area or the environmental quality of any
port, harbor or navigable water of the United States. This
condition could include but is not limited to fire,
explosion, grounding, leaking, damage, illness of a person,
or a manning shortage. ,,234
Not only does the Captain of the Port have the ability
to control towing vessels subsequent to casualties, an
argument can be made that a responsibility to control the
vessel exist which dictates exercising the control upon
notification that a casualty occurs. This control should be
233 Title 33 Code of Federal Regulations Section 160.215
234 Ibid., section 160.203
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applied until such time that the cause of the casualty can
be ascertained through preliminary investigation. Since
towing vessels are uninspected vessels, the Coast Guard
Captain of the Port should impose a restriction on vessel
movements when the cause of a casualty such as an allision
or grounding is alleged to be mechanical failure. This
should be done to ensure that the towing vessel can proceed
safely, while also verifying that mechanical failure is not
just offered as an excuse to avoid personnel investigations.
Vessel movement can be restricted through a Captain of the
Port Order under Title 33 Code of Federal Regulations
Section 160.111. The regulation authorizes the "Captain of
the Port to order a vessel to operate in a manner directed
when it has been determined that such an order is justified
in the interest of safety by reason of the condition of the
vessel. II 235
Since towing vessels are uninspected and not required
to be manned with licensed engineers who could conduct a
satisfactory material examination, the order should
stipulate that the towing vessel is detained at its current
location until such time that the Captain of the Port is
provided with a report from a qualified marine surveyor.
The order should require a survey, either general or
partial, according to the circumstances. The survey should
be extensive enough to ensure that necessary repairs or
renewals were effectively completed, that the material and
235 Ibid., Section 160. III
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workmanship of such repairs or renewals are in all respects
satisfactory, to ensure that the vessel is in satisfactory
condition and fit for the service for which it was intended.
Nothing should be construed as limiting the surveyor from
making such test or examinations as deemed necessary to be
assured of the safety and seaworthiness of the vessel.
The surveyor's report should clearly state the nature
of the mechanical failure; action taken to correct the
failure to prevent recurrence; and a statement that the
towing vessel is fit for its intended route and service.
Only when a surveyor confirms that the unsafe condition has
been corrected can the Captain of the Port be assured that
the vessel can proceed safely; at which time the order
should be rescinded allowing the vessel to proceed. If a
marine surveyor determines that mechanical failure was not a
factor, the need for a personnel investigation would be
self-evident.
The surveyor's material examination would also support
a presumption of negligence following a rebuttal by a
respondent in an administrative hearing. The surveyor's
report would also provide substantial justification to
profer charges against the mariner which later could be used
to avert adversary adjudication during the appeal process.
An Investigating officer must overcome many obstacles
to pursue personnel action following a towing vessel
grounding or allision, regardless of a presumption of
negligence which is supposed to shift the burden of proof.
Temporary suspension authority would provide some relief.
93
CHAPTER 8: ADDRESSING BOTH SAFETY ABD LACK OF EVIDENCE
TEMPORARY SUSPENSION AUTHORIZED BY OPA 90
In chapter 5 it was mentioned that temporary suspension
authority would eventually become a remedial action
available to an investigating officer. The oil Pollution
Act of 1990, Section 4103(a)(1) amended Title 46 united
States Code Section 7702(d) which states that:
"(1) The Secretary may temporarily, for not more than
45 days, suspend and take possession of the license,
certificate of registry, or merchant mariner's document
held by an individual if, when acting under the
authority of that license, certificate, or document
(A) that individual performs a safety sensitive
function on a vessel, as determined by the
Secretary; and
(B) there is probable cause to believe that the
individual--
(i) has performed the safety sensitive function
in violation of law or Federal regulation
regarding use of alcohol or a dangerous drug;
(ii) has been convicted of an offense that
would prevent the issuance or renewal of the
license certificate, or document; or
(iii) within the 3-year period preceding the
initiation of a suspension proceeding, has been
convicted of an offense described in section
205(a)(3) (A) or (B) of the National Driver
Register Act of 1982. ,,236
"(2) If a license, certificate, or document is
temporarily suspended under this section, an expedited
hearing shall be held within 30 days after the
temporary suspension. ,,237
Almost five years later, this section of law has not
been implemented by Federal regulation. It is anticipated
236 Title 46 united States Code Section 7702(d), as amended
by the oil Pollution Act of 1990, Public Law 101-380,
Section 4103, August 18, 1990.
237 Ibid.
94
that a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) will be
published in the Federal Register during May, 1995. While
the law provides authority for temporary suspension, the
authority has been used sparingly thus far. The Coast
Guard's informal policy is to avoid using this enforcement
tool until after implementing regulations have been
formalized. 238 The potential for adversary adjudication,
alone, justifies delaying implementation of this law without
additional regulations. Depending upon the pending
regulation, adversary adjudication could burden the Coast
Guard until such time that consistent policy and use is
established. Although the potential for adversary
adjudication alone should not deter its use. Actually,
temporary suspension is a new concept which should be
applied whenever a presumption of negligence can be
established.
PROPOSAL TO EXPAND TEMPORARY SUSPENSION AUTHORITY
Temporary suspension is an innovative enforcement tool
which could prove to be beneficial if it were authorized for
other charges in addition to the violation of law or Federal
regulation regarding use of alcohol or a dangerous drug.
Certainly, legislation would be a prerequisite to such
authority. Justification for such authority does exist.
238 Grossetti, Mark A., Lieutenant Commander, Chi~f,
Personnel Action Branch, u.s. Coast Guard Offlce of
Marine Safety, Security and Environmental protection,
Marine Investigations Division (G-MMI-2), Tel. (202)267-
2215 interview with Paul Cormier on November 10, 1994.
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Title 46 United States Code Section 7702(d)(1)(B)(i)
allows for temporary suspension when there is probable cause
to believe that the individual has performed the safety-
sensitive function in violation of law or Federal regulation
regarding use of alcohol. A temporary suspension can occur
even though the use of alcohol may only temporarily impair
an individual's ability to perform the safety-sensitive
function.
using alcohol while performing a safety-sensitive
function seems to be an unreasonable act which may not
recur. Even if its an isolated incident, the law allows for
the temporary suspension of a license, certificate of
registry or merchant mariner's document for as long as 45
days prior to a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge.
Additionally, it's interesting to note that the Secretary
can temporarily suspend a license for an unreasonable act,
such as using alcohol while performing a safety-sensitive
function which may, but does not, contribute to the cause of
a marine casualty.
This use of alcohol while performing a safety-sensitive
function may be an isolated incident. Merely a temporary
impairment which does not result in a reportable marine
casualty, but does justify a temporary suspension.
Ironically, the Secretary does not have the authority to
temporarily suspend a license for an unreasonable action or
inaction in the performance of a safety-sensitive function
which does contribute to the cause of a marine casualty.
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Committing an unreasonable action or failing to perform
an act which results in a grounding or allision may be an
isolated situation, just like the case where alcohol is
used. This simply could be referred to as a temporary
impairment. The difference is that in the first instance
where alcohol is involved, there is no marine casualty
involved but immediate remedial action is available. In the
second case there is a marine casualty, but there is no
provision for immediate remedial action.
The second case appears to be a worst-case scenario,
which cannot be dealt with in the same swift and decisive
manner as the case where using alcohol did not contribute to
a marine casualty. Both situations indicate that a problem
exists which requires remedial action to prevent recurrence.
Committing an unreasonable action or failing to perform
an act is a human factor which may also be classified as
negligence. Negligence is defined as "the commission of an
act which a reasonable and prudent person of the same
station under the same circumstances would not commit, or
the failure to perform an act which a reasonable and prudent
person of the same station, under the same circumstances,
would not fail to perform. ,,239
239 Title 46 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 5.29.
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As previously mentioned, negligence is a chargeable
offense under Title 46 Code of Federal Regulations Part 5,
whereby administrative action may be taken against a
mariner's license, certificates or documents issued by the
Coast Guard.
When a person does not act reasonably in the
circumstances presented, the actions cannot be excused as an
error in judgment. "Error in jUdgment is distinguishable
from negligence. On an occasion when an individual is
placed in a position, not of his own making, where he must
choose between two apparently reasonable alternatives, and
the individual responds in a reasonable fashion using
prudent jUdgment in choosing an alternative that hindsight
shows was a poor choice under the circumstances he is not
negligent. But hindsight is not the measure of
compliance. ,,2';0
As previously mentioned, there is a presumption of
negligence in the case of groundings and allisions. In
these situations a casualty has occurred which was the
result of an unreasonable action or a failure to perform an
act that a reasonable and prudent person would not fail to
perform. Unlike groundings and allisions, alcohol cases do
not carry a rebuttable presumption which would shift the
burden of evidence to the respondent. Therefore, the burden
of proof rest with the Coast Guard Investigating Officer who
240 United States of America, U.S. Coast Guard v. License
No. 545675 (Payne), Decision of the Vice Commandant on
Appeal No. 2325, September 29, 1993.
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must present evidence from the onset to win a case where
alcohol was present and no casualty occurred. This is not
an argument to eliminate temporary suspensions for operating
while intoxicated; instead, it is an argument to grant
similar powers whenever a presumption of negligence exist.
Furthermore, since the courts have upheld a presumption of
negligence in grounding and allision cases which shifts the
burden of proof rest to the respondent; temporary suspension
should not require a follow-up administrative hearing within
45 days as is required for alcohol cases. The suspension
should be a final action subject to appeal, but not a
hearing. Ultimately, such authority would serve to address
human causal factors following towing vessel groundings and
allisions where the record shows that enforcement efforts
have been lacking.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(1) The record shows that legislation proposed by
members of the 103rd Congress was well intended, but ill
conceived.
(a) The proposed law was premature. The cause of
the AMTRAK disaster was not conclusive when the legislation
was proposed. It is recommended that any future legislation
intended to prevent recurrence of a casualty stem from a
thorough investigation performed by the executive branch of
government as required by law and regulation.
(b) The introduction of legislation was prompt, but
only in relationship to the amount of time that passed
between the date of the casualty and the date that
legislation was proposed. Hasty introduction of The Towing
Vessel Safety Act of 1993 may have resulted in a lack of
both substance and public support. It is recommended that
any future legislation intended to prevent recurrence of a
casualty stem from a thorough investigation performed by the
executive branch of government as required by law and
regulation.
(c) The legislation was overdue. Legislation did
not prevent the towboat CHRIS from striking the Judge Seeber
Bridge. Nor did it prevent the similar AMTRAK disaster from
occurring; therefore, it is obvious that any legislation
that might have prevented recurrence was overdue.
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Unfortunately, anyone can speculate as to the ability of
proposed legislation to prevent similar casualties from
recurring. While legislation may not adequately prevent
similar casualties from occurring, legislation could prevent
similar causal factors. It is recommended that any future
legislation intended to prevent recurrence of a casualty
stern from a thorough investigation performed by the
executive branch of government as required by law and
regulation.
(d) The proposed legislation's content was not
necessary, but Congressional scrutiny was necessary. While
AWO argues that the legislation was unnecessary, the threat
of legislation caused the towing industry to seek a
proactive partnership with government. The pUblic debate
over proposed legislation opened a dialogue between the
Towing Vessel Industry and the Coast Guard. Effectively,
the navigation safety equipment requirements suggested in
the Towing Vessel Safety Act of 1993 will be promulgated as
regulation under the authority of the Ports and Waterways
Safety Act. Current plans to improve safety through
prevention of casualties include: proposing regulations to
develop a master, mate and apprentice scheme for towing
vessels and require radar endorsements. In retrospect, the
proposed legislation was helpful. The law instilled a fear
of a regulatory watershed. Where industry support for new
regulations now exist, it did not before the proposed laws.
No recommendation.
101
(e) Law that exempts some towing vessels from
licensing requirements runs counter to the regulatory plan.
It is recommended that the Coast Guard task MERPAC and TSAC
with reviewing the exemption's overall impact. since
MERPAC's membership is primarily licensed personnel
representing management and labor, it is anticipated that
they would suggest repealing the exemption. It is difficult
to anticipate what TSACs opinion might be. It is
recommended that Congress repeal the exemption clause which
allows towing vessels under 200 gross tons to operate with
unlicensed operators engaged in the offshore mineral and oil
industry upon receipt of a recommendation from the Coast
Guard and endorsements from MERPAC and TSAC.
2. The Coast Guard did not adequately address the
human factor in groundings in 1992 and 1993. It is not
known if similar casualties have occurred as a result of not
initiating personnel investigations. Additionally, it is
not known if remedial action would have resulted from
personnel investigations during that time period. To
maintain standards of competence and conduct essential to
promotion of maritime safety, the Coast Guard should
initiate a personnel investigation and take appropriate
remedial action following all towing vessel groundings and
allisions. When a grounding or allision is caused by a
human factor, there is probable cause to initiate a
personnel investigation. While there may be a presumption
of negligence in these cases, a personnel investigation may
reveal that no personnel action is necessary. Subsequent to
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conducting personnel investigations where personnel action
is warranted, the Investigating Officer should initiate
remedial action.
(a) It is recommended that the Coast Guard conduct
an internal audit to determine why personnel investigations
were not initiated in 75% of the towing vessel groundings
involving human causal factors in 1992 and 1993.
(b) It is recommended that the Coast Guard establish
a national policy requiring personnel investigations
whenever a presumption of negligence may exist. Any
personnel action taken can be used later as evidence in
aggravation or mitigation in any personnel action involving
the same respondent.
(c) Whereas the Ports and Waterways Safety Act will
be used to regulate navigation Safety Equipment, it can and
should also be used to control the movement of towing
vessels subsequent to groundings and allisions. Issuing
Captain of the Port Orders requiring a surveyor's
examination and report is justified to ensure that a towing
vessel can proceed safely after a casualty. Requiring a
surveyor's report may also benefit the Coast Guard's
personnel investigation program. It is recommended that the
Coast Guard establish a national policy that requires a
surveyor's examination and report following a towing vessel
grounding or allision, whenever, the alleged causal factor
is mechanical in nature.
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(d) OPA 90 introduced temporary suspension
authority. The application of this innovative concept
should be expanded to address some casualties caused by
human factors. The Investigating Officer should be provided
authority to summarily suspend licenses where a presumption
of negligence exist. Unlike the authority provided by OPA
90, the licensed operator should have the opportunity to
reject the temporary suspension. This is similar to the
operator's right to reject an Investigating Officer's letter
of warning. Upon rejection of summary suspension, an
Investigating Officer could choose between proferring
charges for negligence, issue a letter of warning or close
the case without action. Unlike the OPA version which
requires a hearing within 30 days; no further hearing should
be required after acceptance of a summary suspension. The
summary suspension should be added to the respondent's
record which can be submitted and considered as evidence in
aggravation or mitigation in any future suspension and
revocation proceeding. The impact of this authority can
serve to deter acts of negligence which result in groundings
and allisions; ultimately reducing the occurrence of the
these marine casualties. It is recommended that the Coast
Guard propose legislation which can provide immediate
remedial action following personnel investigations where the
presumption of negligence exist.
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3. TSAC's charter is currently scheduled to expire on
September 30, 1995.
(a) It is recommended that the Coast Guard propose
legislation to extend the termination date now, so that new
legislation is approved before the 104th Congress concludes.
4. This paper noted that reference made to 46 USC 239
in the text of 49 CFR 850 is erroneous and has been outdated
since August 1983.
(a) It is recommended that the Coast Guard and NTSB
take action to amend 49 CFR 850 to reflect a reference to
Title 46 USC Section 7701 to 7701 vice Title 46 USC 239.
In summary, focusing events influence the regulatory
process. To date, much has been said but little has been
done to prevent towing vessel casualties from occurring.
The challenge ahead requires implementing new towing vessel
safety initiatives which adequately investigate and address
human factors in towing vessel casualties whenever a
presumption of negligence exist.
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